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The main assumption of eﬃciency wages models and their main
deviation from the standard neoclassical or competitive model of the
labour market is that wages aﬀect workers productive behaviour.1
If information about the worker’s actions or type is imperfect and
the required productive behaviour or quality of workers cannot be
enforced or elicited costlessly, then it may be optimal for employers
to pay above the worker’s outside option2 or the market clearing
wage.3
The optimal above-market clearing (eﬃciency) wage is set so that
its marginal beneﬁt4 is equal to its marginal cost. In general equi-
librium, and provided that ﬁrms are identical, if ﬁrms ﬁnd optimal
to pay an above market clearing wage5 then this will result in in-
voluntary unemployment, as workers that want to work at a lower
than the eﬃciency wage will not be able to ﬁnd a job.6
Therefore, the eﬃciency wage theory oﬀers an explanation of in-
voluntary unemployment as it can explain why wages do not fall for
the labour market to clear (Akerloﬀ and Yellen 1986, Katz 1986,
Weiss 1990). It is also true that eﬃciency wages theory can ex-
plain other labour market phenomena as wage diﬀerentials of equally
skilled workers (Krueger and Summers 1988, Gibbons and Katz
1992) in the same occupation and dual labour markets (Jones 1985,
1987, Bulow and Summers 1986).
In general the source of the problem is that, according to the
eﬃciency wage theory, wages are used by employers as a personnel
policy device to recruit, retain and motivate employees as well as to
determine employment ( Layard, Nickell and Jackman 1991). Thus,
1In particular higher wages increase workers’ eﬀort (Solow 1979, Yellen 1984, Stiglitz 1986)
or prevent shirking (Shapiro and Stiglitz 1984), improve the average quality of a ﬁrm’s ap-
plicants pool (Weiss 1980, 1990), decrease quits and turnover (Salop 1979) improve morale
a n dw o r k e r sa s s o c i a t i o nw i t ht h eﬁrm (Akerloﬀ 1982, 1984), as well as decrease collective
disruptive behaviour (union threat) (Dickens 1986).
2Alternatively, and in particular under agency problems, employers may use bonding, in-
centive contracts in which compensation is tied to outcomes (Milgrom and Roberts 1992)
or tournaments (Lazear and Rosen 1981) to overcome the problem of asymmetric informa-
tion. All the above types of labour contracts are more eﬃcient than eﬃciency wages (Weiss
1990, Milgrom and Roberts 1992), but when they are not feasible, eﬃciency wages are to be
preferred.
3I ti st h ew a g ep r e m i u ma b o v et h em a r k e tc l e a r i n gw a g ea n dn o tt h ew a g ep e rs et h a t
aﬀects workers’ productive behaviour in general equilibrium.
4According to the main assumption of eﬃciency wage models, higher wages generate ben-
eﬁts to ﬁrms by increasing proﬁts through higher labour productivity induced through higher
eﬀort, and lower turnover, shirking and malfeasance costs.
5The market clearing wage is equal to worker’s alternative value of time, which is the min-
imum level of the wage at which employees would be willing to accept the job (the worker’s
reservation wage). The eﬃciency wage by construction exceeds the market clearing (reserva-
tion) wage by a wage premium that is paid in order to elicit the required behaviour or quality
of workers.
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2if another mechanism could serve the ﬁrst role, then ﬁrms would
pay the lowest possible wage that will satisfy their labour demand
and the labour market will clear.7
An alternative device to higher wages that serves in motivating
and retaining employees is bonding8or entry fees which are repaid
to workers towards their working lives, where workers are forced
t op o s tab o n dw h e nj o i nt h eﬁrm, which they will forfeit when
they quit or found shirking (Weiss 1990). Partly for legal reasons
or because of capital market imperfections we rarely observe any
explicit bonding where workers have to pay a lump sum amount
when join the ﬁrm (Katz 1986, Rebitzer 1989, Ritter and Taylor
1997) but we do observe entry fees in the form of lower wages for
newly hired workers (Lazear 1986, Krueger 1991).
However, lower starting wages and steeper tenure/earnings pro-
ﬁles are subject to moral hazard problems as it is the case that the
ﬁrm will have an incentive to ﬁre the worker at the timing the entry
fee must be refunded (Weiss, 1990). Moreover, bonding cannot be
used by ﬁrms to tackle any adverse selection problems (Katz 1986,
Rebitzer 1989, Weiss 1990, Ritter and Taylor 1997) .
I nD i c k e n s ,K a t za n dL a n g( 1 9 8 5 )i ti sa r g u e dt h a tt h ep a y m e n to f
eﬃciency wages cannot be ruled out on a priori theoretical grounds.
The main argument against eﬃciency wages is that, it is not an
eﬃcient way to induce motivation or prevent workers malfeasance.
The eﬃcient way is bonding,9 which seems to be limited because of
capital market and other constraints, and also because it is observed
that employers devote a considerable amount of resources in moni-
toring (Dickens, Katz and Lang 1985). Given, that bonding is not
feasible10 because of the theoretical considerations above, eﬃciency
wages may be a second best mechanism that elicits productivity and
enhances quality of employees.
In sum the relevance of eﬃciency wages is an empirical not a the-
oretical question. In particular, whether wages substantially aﬀect
aspects of employees’ productivity, and whether employers pay eﬃ-
ciency wages as a personnel policy device instead of using alternative
mechanisms, are matters that can only be resolved empirically.
7Provided that another mechanism is used to perform the personnel management role of
wages, ﬁrms would like rationally to set the wage to minus inﬁnity! However, to ensure workers
participation ﬁrms pay the worker’s outside option so that labour supply meets labour demand
and the market clears.
8This is an eﬃcient mechanism as it does not alter the present discounted value of com-
pensation compared to the full information case (Lazear 1979, 1981, Krueger 1991), but it
alters the slope of the tenure/earnings proﬁle.
9Eﬃciency can be also achieved by other forms of incentive contracts that can allocate
resources as in the full information case. In thec a s et h a tp r i v a t ei n f o rmation renders the
full information outcome non-feasible, then any incentive eﬃcient contract is to be preferred
(Milgrom and Roberts 1992).
10See also Weiss 1990, Stiglitz 1987, Ritter and Taylor 1997 for an analytic discussion on
the alternatives to eﬃciency wages and their limitations.
3Even though there are numerous empirical studies of eﬃciency
wages, it is generally agreed that there is no convincing evidence of
eﬃciency wages as there are many problems that render the empir-
ical investigation of eﬃciency wages particularly vexing (Cappelli
and Chauvin 1992, Rebitzer 1995). Moreover, diﬀerent empirical
methodologies have been adopted in the empirical analysis of eﬃ-
ciency wages that each has its qualiﬁcations and limitations but no
methodology seems to address eﬀectively the main empirical prob-
lems and provide persuasive evidence that support or dismiss eﬃ-
ciency wage theories (Manning and Thomas 1997, Autor 2003).
In this paper, we provide an empirical test of eﬃciency wage
theory by testing the prediction of the ‘shirking’ and ‘gift-exchange’
models of eﬃciency wages that in equilibrium there is a trade-oﬀ
b e t w e e nh i g h e rw a g e sa n ds u p e r v i s i on using establishment level data
from the British Workplace Industrial Relations Survey (WIRS) of
1990.
In the case of unskilled manual employees, we ﬁnd that the en-
dogeneity bias generated by omission of factors that are correlated
with wages and supervision intensity is expected to be positive and
thus it may mask any wage-supervision trade-oﬀ that may be in op-
eration. This latter ﬁnding may provide some support to eﬃciency
wages, as the main omitted factors considered are correlated with
wages and supervision only under an eﬃciency wage rational of wage
and supervision determination.
Moreover, we also ﬁnd evidence of a signiﬁcant negative relation-
ship between wages and supervision for unskilled manual employees
across privately-owned, non-unionised establishments. This ﬁnding
is not only consistent with eﬃciency wages, as there are other expla-
nations of the wage-supervision trade-oﬀ provided in the literature,
one of which is developed in this paper. In particular, our novel the-
oretical explanation suggests that a negative relationship between
wages and supervision may be the result of unobserved diﬀerences
in union bargaining power across ﬁrms when there is ﬁrm-union bar-
gaining over eﬀort and unions ‘like’ wages and ‘dislike’ supervision.
We further try to sort out alternative theoretical explanations of
the wage-supervision trade-oﬀ, using the evidence on the sign of the
endogeneity bias. Our analysis seems to provide stronger support to
the eﬃciency wage rational of wage/supervision determination-that
wages and supervision are substitutes in eliciting higher eﬀort by
unskilled manual employees- than alternative theories.
However, as the latter evidence is necessary but not suﬃcient for
the validity of eﬃciency wages we also test whether employers paid
eﬃciency wages in order to elicit productive behaviour by unskilled
manual workers by increasing the wage up to the point where the
marginal cost of the wage is exactly oﬀset by a fall in supervision
costs. The main conclusion of the test is that we cannot dismiss the
4payment of eﬃciency wages to unskilled manual workers.
For semi-skilled and skilled manual workers, although the pat-
tern of ﬁndings is similar to that of unskilled and seems consistent
with a positive omitted variable bias, we ﬁnd no evidence of a sig-
niﬁcant positive bias in the coeﬃcient of interest and no systematic
evidence of a negative relationship between wages and supervision.
Finally, in the case of skilled workers we ﬁnd evidence that provide
some support to our prediction that unobserved variation in union
bargaining power across establishments may cause a negative bias in
the estimated coeﬃcient of supervision intensity included in skilled
wage equations.
As the data are not drawn from a particular industry, but for
many diﬀerent sectors throughout the British industry our ﬁndings
can be generalised and seem to provide some support to the hypoth-
esis that eﬃciency wages considerations may be valid for relatively
less-skilled, low-wage employees which may further imply that the
eﬃciency wage theory could provide particular insight into the work-
ings of low-wage labour markets.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: In section 2 we
present a review of the empirical studies of the eﬃciency wage the-
ory and their main qualiﬁcations and limitations, whereas in section
3 we present a sketch of our methodology and summarise the main
competing theoretical explanations of the wage-supervision trade-oﬀ
as well as the main empirical problems hindered empirical studies
of eﬃciency wages. In section 4 we present a discussion of the lim-
itations and qualiﬁcations of our data and in section 5 we present
the estimation results for unskilled, semi-skilled and skilled manual
workers. Finally in the last section we oﬀer a summary and the
main conclusions of the paper.
2 Review of the Literature
The main empirical question of eﬃciency wage theory is twofold:
Is it true that wages aﬀect workers’ productivity? And if it is true
then: Do employers consider as optimal to pay above market clear-
ing (eﬃciency) wages, instead of using alternative devices (for ex-
ample lower starting wages), to elicit the required productive be-
haviour or quality of employees? (Cappelli-Chauvin1991, Manning
and Thomas 1997).
Testing only a weak form of the above main empirical hypothesis
of eﬃciency wages would be to test whether or not wages aﬀect pro-
ductivity, which consists a necessary but not suﬃcient condition11
11As discussed above two conditions must be satisﬁed simultaneously for eﬃciency wages
to hold: a) wages should aﬀect worker’s productivity and b) employers should ﬁnd optimal to
set wages above the market clearing level in order to elicit the required action or quality of
5for eﬃciency wages to hold.
There are several studies that test whether or not higher wages
contribute to output by estimating production functions with wages
included together with other inputs (Wadhwani and Wall 1991,
Levine 1992, Konings and Walsh 1994). These kind of studies suﬀer
from the fact that there are unobserved factors that aﬀect produc-
tivity and are correlated with wages. In these studies, there is also
the econometric problem of identiﬁcation; Are wages the cause or
the result of higher productivity? (Cappelli and Chauvin 1991)
Moreover, as we argued above, this kind of evidence is necessary
but not suﬃcient to make the eﬃciency wages story valid and that is
why it is also important to provide evidence that employers set wages
above the market clearing level to induce worker productivity.12
The main problem in testing this latter (optimality) condition of
eﬃciency wages is that most of the times the gains of higher produc-
tivity or quality of employees induced by higher wages are diﬃcult
to measure, as eﬃciency wages arise in situations where workers’
actions and quality are private information (Rebitzer 1995). More-
over, another problem could be that wages are not set unilaterally
by employers, as unions and other institutions (minimum wages for
example) may intervene in the wage determination process.
The latter point, consists the major criticism of the validity of
the ﬁndings of one of the most credible attempts to provide evidence
on eﬃciency wages, presented by Cappelli and Chauvin (1991). On
the one hand, Cappelli and Chauvin’s analysis addresses some of the
standard empirical problems discussed above, but on the other hand
in their setting, wages are not set unilaterally but are the result of
collective bargaining at the company level (Manning and Thomas
1997).13
A second type of evidence on eﬃciency wages is evidence from the
wage structure. In particular studies of interindustry wage diﬀeren-
tials (Dickens and Katz 1987, Krueger and Summers 1988), provide
evidence that unobserved diﬀerences in human capital and working
conditions cannot explain a major component of the variation in
wages, a ﬁnding which may suggest that the remaining variation
employees. The above two conditions are necessary and suﬃcient for the validity of eﬃciency
wages.
12In other words wages are set optimally so that the marginal beneﬁto ft h ew a g ei se q u a l
to the marginal cost.
13Cappelli and Chauvin test empirically the relationship that higher wages are associated
with lower level of shirking, that is generated by the Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) shirking
model of eﬃciency wages. Although, their data allowed them to deal with the identiﬁcation
problem mentioned above and any empirical problems caused by unobserved heterogeneity,
their evidence that there is a negative correlation between wages and disciplinary dismissals
provides support only to one of the necessary and suﬃcient conditions of empirical eﬃciency
wages tests, namely that wages aﬀect employees’ productive behaviour. However, Autor
(2003) explains that this is ’as good as it gets’.
6could be attributed to eﬃciency wages.
However, this evidence does not consist, explicit evidence of eﬃ-
ciency wages as there is a considerable literature on whether these
industry eﬀects actually exist (Murphy and Topel 1987, Gibbons
and Katz 1992) but even if they do exist, according to Manning and
Thomas (1997) their relationship with eﬃciency wages is tenuous.
An explanation of this latter criticism may be that inter-industry
wage diﬀerentials suggest ex post rents in certain jobs, as suggested
by lower turnover and longer tenure in high wage ‘premium’ jobs
(Krueger and Summers 1988), whereas evidence on ex ante rents
would potentially be more convincing (Autor 2003).14
Additionally, eﬃciency wages may also oﬀer a potential expla-
nation of why larger ﬁrms and ﬁrms with higher proﬁts pay higher
wages, which consist two well-documented facts in the wage deter-
mination literature.15 However, there is no evidence to support the
eﬃciency wages explanation of the employer size and proﬁte ﬀects
on wages (Kruse 1992, Ewing and Payne 1999, Brown -Medoﬀ 1989,
Blanchﬂower et al. 1996).
Given the problems of the above type of empirical studies, alter-
native ways have been also suggested in order to test the validity of
eﬃciency wages theories. In particular, an indirect way of testing
the eﬀect of wages on productivity is to test the relationship be-
tween wages and other means of regulating the activities of employ-
ees. If high wages elicit productivity or quality enhancing actions
from employees then, all else equal, high wages employers should
devote fewer resources to monitoring and checking worker activities
(Rebitzer 1995).16
Particularly, an inverse relationship between wages and super-
vision intensity is a prediction of both the ‘shirking’(Shapiro and
Stiglitz 1984) and the ‘gift-exchange’(Akerloﬀ 1982) model of eﬃ-
ciency wages, although this occurs via diﬀerent mechanisms.
In the shirking model17 an increase in the wage, provided that
14This kind of evidence are provided by Holzer, Katz and Krueger (1991) who ﬁnd that
there exist workers queues in minimum wage jobs which further implies the existence of rents
at these jobs. However, once more eﬃciency wages is one of the potential explanations of the
ﬁndings of the Holzer et al’s study.
15For example, as in larger ﬁr m si ti sm o r ed i ﬃcult to detect shirkers, given everything else
equal, wages must rise to prevent shirking (Brown and Medoﬀ 1989, Kruse 1992). Moreover,
in the absence of collective bargaining, workers may expect to be paid more if the ﬁrm is
proﬁtable and to slack oﬀ if they are not paid more (rent sharing hypothesis of eﬃciency
wages see Layard et al. 1991)
16This holds, given that monitoring increases motivation, as there are theoretical models
predicting the opposite (Frey 1992).
17Under the shirking framework (Shapiro and Stiglitz 1984) from the worker’s decision
problem between working and shirking it is derived the so-called ‘non-shirking condition’ which
determines the wage necessary to prevent shirking, as a function of exogenous parameters,
including eﬀort. In this version of the shirking model, for simplicity eﬀort is binary (0 if shirk,
1 if work) and monitoring technology is also exogenous. Under a continuous eﬀort version of
7everything else is constant, increases the penalty to the shirker when
is caught and being dismissed and thus discourages shirking.18 On
the other hand, eﬀort is increasing in monitoring intensity, again
ceteris paribus, because this increases the probability of detection
of a shirking worker which in turn decreases the expected payoﬀ
of shirking and thus induces more motivation. Given that eﬀort is
increasing in both the wage and monitoring intensity, we expect that
these motivation devices are substitutes in eliciting eﬀort,19 which
implies that, in equilibrium, an increase in the one, for given eﬀort,
will result in a decrease in the other.20
In other words, in equilibrium, if the wage is increased this will
decrease the propensity of a worker to shirk, and for given eﬀort,
monitoring intensity must be relaxed and vice versa. Therefore,
for given employee’s eﬀort there is a trade-oﬀ between wages and
monitoring intensity.
In the ‘gift-exchange’ model, supervision is not central to the
problem of motivation. Rather ﬁrms devote resources to supervi-
sion in order to coordinate the activities of the direct producers
and ensure product quality ex post (Rebitzer 1995). Under, this
model higher pay is considered as a ‘gift’ that appeals to norms of
reciprocity, and thus induces more eﬀort and substitution of self-
monitoring for external monitoring. Thus, there are two diﬀerent
the shirking model (see chapter 2 and Georgiadis, 2001), the non-shirking condition can be
used to express eﬀort as an increasing function of the eﬃciency wage and monitoring intensity
which is usually approximated by the ratio of supervisors to staﬀ.
18This can be thought as a substitution eﬀect of an increase in the wage on the worker’s
eﬀort choice, which means that the shirking model may neglect any income eﬀect of a higher
wage on the choice of the eﬀort level by employees. This is because in general the decision of
eﬀort supply by employees can be thought as equivalent to the supply of the intensity of work
i . eh o wh a r do n ew i l lw o r k ,w h i c hc a nb em o d e lled similarly to labour supply (how much one
will work). Thus, an increase in the wage on the one hand increases eﬀort because leisure
in terms of shirking becomes more expensive (substitution eﬀe c to rh i g h e re x p e c t e dc o s to f
shirking) but on the other hand decreases eﬀort, as income increases and given that leisure is
an o r m a lg o o d ,l e s se ﬀort will be provided (income eﬀect). Since the income eﬀect of a higher
wage should be present, strictly speaking the shirking model should implicitly postulate that
t h ei n c o m ee ﬀect is suﬃciently small so that eﬀort is increasing in the wage.
19The wage premium and monitoring intensity are also substitutes in production. This
is because, under a production function with eﬃcient labour inputs (a combination of the
number of employees and the intensity they work), an increase in the wage, given everything
else constant, increases eﬀort and so output, and thus monitoring intensity must fall for output
to remain constant. Therefore, isoquants as well as isoeﬀort curves slope downwards in the
wage-monitoring intensity space. In other words the marginal rate of substitution between
wages and monitoring intensity is negative. In general, there are many channels via which
wages may aﬀect output and thus wages can be incorporated in the production function
directly or indirectly via an eﬀo r to rq u i tf u n c t i o nf o re x a m p l e .
20As suggested by Bowles (1995) and Gordon (1990, 1993) inter alia, one should expect
that at suﬃciently low levels of supervision, wages will have a minor or negligible eﬀect on
employees eﬀort, irrespective of how high they are set as the threat of losing the wage premium
is not credible. The same holds for supervision intensity at suﬃciently low wages. This point
doesn’t suggest that wages and supervision are complements but instead suggests that isoeﬀort
curves are decreasing and convex in the wage-supervision intensity space.
8mechanisms via which the wage-supervision trade-oﬀ may result, in
eﬃciency wage theory.21
A potential virtue of this testing approach of eﬃciency wages is
that the beneﬁt of the wage can be explicitly measured by gains in
terms of supervision costs, which implies that one can test, given an
estimate of the wage-supervision trade-oﬀ, if the increase in the wage
c o s t si se x a c t l yo ﬀset by a decrease in supervision costs and thus
whether wage increases ‘pay for themselves’ (Levine 1992). This
condition can be quite informative as far as the validity of one of
the conditions of eﬃciency wages discussed above, even under the
problems, that arise by unions and other institutional interventions
in the wage determination.22
Empirical tests of eﬃciency wages that are based on the investi-
gation of the relationship between wages and supervision have been
mainly hindered by the problem of endogeneity bias in the estimates
of interest. The ﬁrst two sources of endogeneity bias are omitted
variables and simultaneity, as the supervisor to staﬀ ratio which
is the most usual proxy for the intensity of monitoring, is endoge-
neously and simultaneously determined with wages (Groshen and
Krueger 1990, Krueger 1991, Rebitzer 1995). The third source of
endogeneity is due to measurement error, again resulting because
of the use of the ratio of supervisors to staﬀ as a proxy for mon-
itoring, as it may be the case that supervisors spend only a frac-
tion of their time monitoring production employees (Rebitzer 1995,
Brunello 1995).
Another important criticism, that is often been neglected in the
literature, is that testing the wage-supervision trade-oﬀ is not equiv-
alent as testing eﬃciency wages, ﬁrstly because there are also other
explanations of the trade-oﬀ than eﬃciency wages (Kruse 1992)
and second because any evidence of a wage-supervision trade-oﬀ
is viewed as indirect evidence of eﬀects of wages on workers produc-
tive behaviour, which is a necessary but not a suﬃcient condition
for the validity of eﬃciency wages (see following sections).
Some of the empirical studies of the relationship between wages
and monitoring or supervision include Fitzroy and Kraft (1986),
21There is a subtle diﬀerence between the two models. In the gift-exchange model, employers
set wages directly and via wages supervision intensity is also determined. Thus, under this
model wage changes have an eﬀect on supervision because wages appeal to norms of reciprocity
and not the other way around. In the contrary in the shirking model a change in the wage
have an eﬀect on the level of supervision and vice versa.
22In the presense of collective bargaining and given that there are valid eﬃciency wages
considerations, under certain conditions, we would expect that the minimum level that the
w a g ec a nb es e ti st h ee ﬃciency wage. Therefore, if the comparison of marginal beneﬁt
and marginal cost of the wage suggests that wages are set below the eﬃciency wage level,
and provided that union bargaining over wages imposes another binding constraint on wage
determination, then this can be clearly interpeted as evidence that dismiss the validity of
eﬃciency wages, even under union intervention.
9Leonard (1987), Neal (1993), Brunello(1995). Fitzroy and Kraft
(1986), investigate the eﬀects of proﬁt-sharing on factors’ produc-
tivity using a sample of workers from 65 West German ﬁrms from the
metalworking industry, and ﬁnd an insigniﬁcant eﬀect of the ratio
of skilled to unskilled workers on proﬁt sharing income of employ-
ees. Moreover, Leonard (1987) estimated wage equations including
as a proxy for monitoring the supervisor to staﬀ ratio for six occu-
pations in a sample of US high-technology ﬁrms but ﬁnds a positive
and insigniﬁcant relationship between pay and supervision in all
occupations.
Similarly, Neal (1993) uses supervision data from the 1977 wave
of the Panel Survey of Income Dynamics, in order to investigate
whether interindustry wage diﬀerentials can be explained by dif-
ferences in supervision by particularly looking whether workers in
high wage industries enjoy more autonomy on the job which is an
implication of dual labour markets arising from diﬀerences in moni-
toring problems (Bulow and Summers 1986). Neal ﬁnds that work-
ers in high-wage industries are at least as intensively supervised as
low-wage, secondary sector workers, and that no evidence can be
provided that inter-industry diﬀerences in monitoring contribute to
inter-industry wage diﬀerentials.
Brunello (1995) explores the relationship between pay and both
the quantity and quality of supervision using data from the New
Earnings Survey over the period between 1975-1982. The main
ﬁnding arising from Brunello’s analysis is that the wage-supervision
trade-oﬀ turns insigniﬁcant once the quality of supervision is in-
cluded in the wage equation which further suggests that errors in
the measurement of supervision aﬀect the outcome of the empirical
investigation of the wage-supervision trade-oﬀ.
Finally Goldin (1986) suggests that sex segregation across jobs
within manufacturing and the standardisation and division of tasks
in female dominated occupations that made monitoring easier may
explain the ﬁnding that there is sex-discrimination over pay in man-
ufacturing.
Two other studies that ﬁnd evidence that supports the wage su-
pervision trade-oﬀ are presented by Kruse (1992) and Ewing and
Payne (1999). Kruse estimates wage equations using data from the
1980 Survey of Jobs Characteristics, and he ﬁnds evidence that sup-
ports a negative relationship between wage and supervision. In par-
ticular, Kruse (1992) ﬁnds that daily supervised workers receive 1.2
per cent lower pay than their weekly supervised colleagues, ceteris
paribus.
Similarly, Ewing and Payne (1999) using a sample of workers from
the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, ﬁnd a negative relation-
ship between their measure of supervision and reported wages. The
common criticism of all the above studies is that they suﬀer from
10the endogeneity problem discussed above.23
Very few studies have managed to tackle the endogeneity problem
successfully by exploiting policy or other interventions, which cause
exogenous and independent variation in the intensity of supervision.
In fact we know three such studies;
One of these studies is presented by Groshen and Krueger (1990),
who exploit the fact that the number of supervisors to staﬀ in the
U.S hospital industry is often regulated by state and local (city)
authorities and that is why the mandated supervisor-to-staﬀ ra-
tio varies by occupation and city. Thus, diﬀerences in the regu-
lated supervisor-to-staﬀ ratio, across standard metropolitan statis-
tical areas in BLS data cause exogenous variation in the supervi-
sor/supervisee ratio. Groshen and Krueger ﬁnd evidence in favour
of a trade-oﬀ between wages and supervision only for the nursing
occupation.
The second study is presented by Krueger (1991), who exploits
the institutional arrangements of the franchise system in the fast
food industry, which are the reason for inferior monitoring in com-
pany owned relative to franchisee-owned outlets. Krueger, ﬁnds that
compensation is not only higher in company compared to franchisee-
owned outlets, but it is also increasing faster with tenure in company-
owned outlets.
Finally, Rebitzer (1995) exploits t h ef a c tt h a ti np e t r o c h e m i c a l
industry there are contract employees who are working in the plant,
and their recruitment, payment and other employment practices are
determined by the contractor employer who sets an agreement with
the host employer. However, because of the high risk on the job in
petrochemical plants, the host employer must also monitor contract
employees, for safety reasons. Thus, host supervision is uncorrelated
with the wage and other employment practices. Again Rebitzer ﬁnds
evidence in favour of the trade-oﬀ between wages and supervision.
A limitation of the above three studies is related to their main
virtue, as they are focusing on speciﬁc industries, where speciﬁc
conditions allow investigators to address the endogeneity problem
and thus their results cannot be generalised. Finally, another major
problem that is shared between all studies of the wage-supervision
trade-oﬀ (irrespective if they address the endogeneity problem or
not) is that they fail to sort out alternative explanations of the
23Brunello (1995) and Brown and Sessions (2002) use instruments for supervision intensity
but the validity of their instruments is based on strong assumptions. Furthermore, there
are studies which suggest that the endogeneity bias is expected to be positive and thus to
mask any wage-supervision trade-oﬀ in operation, a claim that may explain why some of the
studies discussed in this section rendered inconclusive. The positive sign of the endogeneity
b i a si so f t e nu s e da sa na r g u m e n tt os u p p o r tt h ev a l i d i t yo ft h eﬁndings of studies that found
a negative wage-supervision relationship and that do not eﬀectively address the endogeneity
problem (Kruse 1992, Ewing and Payne 1999, Brown and Sessions 2002).
11wage-supervision trade-oﬀ24 but even if this is the case, another
problem is that any evidence of a wage-supervision trade-oﬀ arising
from agency problems cannot be considered as evidence in support
of eﬃciency wages (see following sections).
3 Endogeneity and the Wage-Supervision Rela-
tionship
As discussed in the previous section the main problem of em-
pirical studies that try to identify if there is a wage-supervision
intensity trade-oﬀ by standard estimation of wage equations with a
measure of supervision being one of the explanatory variables, is the
endogeneity of the supervision variable. One of the most eﬀective
ways to tackle the endogeneity problem is to exploit policy or other
interventions that generate exogenous and independent variation in
supervision intensity, as the studies discussed in the previous section
that ﬁnd valid instruments for the endogenous supervision variable
(Wooldridge 2001, Cameron and Trivedi 2005). However, exploit-
ing appropriate policy or other interventions and thus ﬁnding valid
instruments is not an easy task and that is why, as suggested in the
previous section there exist very few studies that manage to do so
(Groshen and Krueger 1990, Krueger 1991, Rebitzer 1995).
Alternatively, when instrumental variables estimation is not pos-
sible, one may be able to reduce the endogeneity bias in the estimates
of the wage-supervision relationship by using regression to control
for confounding factors that are the likely source of endogeneity.
T h e ni tm a yb ep o s s i b l et h a to n ec a nu s et h eo b s e r v e ds i g no ft h e
estimate of the wage-supervision relationship produced by the re-
gressions and any evidence on the direction of the omitted variable
bias to infer the sign of the true relationship between wages and
supervision.25
Standard econometric theory (Greene 2000) suggests that in the
face of endogeneity, the direction of the OLS bias in the estimated
coeﬃcient of interest depends on the relationship between the main
unobserved inﬂuences with the dependent and the endogenous vari-
able respectively. In particular in the wage-supervision estimation,
24For example in Krueger (1991) an alternative interpetation of the ﬁnding of a wage-
supervision trade-oﬀ except of that of more acute agency problems in company-owned restau-
rants is provided by ‘expense preference’ where managers in company owned fast food restau-
rants make their lives easier by paying higher wages at the expense of the company. This has
the same empirical implications as eﬃciency wages except that it is not eﬃcient (Autor 2003).
25For example if the regressions produce evidence of a wage-supervision trade-oﬀ,a n dt h e r e
is also evidence that controlling for potential omitted factors leads to a more negative estimated
coeﬃcient of the eﬀect of supervision intensity on wages, and thus the omitted variable bias is
positive, then one can be quite conﬁdent that the sign of the true relationship between wages
and supervision is negative, and thus there exists a wage-supervision trade-oﬀ.
12the direction of the endogeneity bias depends on the correlation of
the main omitted variables with wages and supervision. However,
one can argue that the nature of the main omitted factors and their
relationship with wages and supervision depend on the rationale
underlying the wage and supervision determination mechanism.
Thus, theory can be informative about the main unobserved fac-
tors that may cause a bias in the estimate of the wage-supervision
relationship. This is why in the next sections we present the main
theories of wage-supervision determination in the literature, as this
is essential in our attempt to determine the main omitted factors
and thus to predict the direction of the endogeneity bias.
In general, diﬀerent theoretical models of wage/supervision de-
termination point towards diﬀerent omitted factors. Thus, including
controls for the omitted factors suggested by a theoretical model of
wage/supervision determination may be indicative of whether the
model is relevant, as evidence that the inclusion of these controls in
the regressions leads to a reduction in the bias of the coeﬃcient of
interest may provide support to the theoretical model. Similarly if
the inclusion of the controls suggested by a theoretical model does
not lead to any change in the coeﬃcient of interest, then this may
be viewed as evidence that the data does not provide support to this
model. Therefore, the latter approach may be a potential way for
the econometrician to sort out alternative theoretical explanations
of a negative or positive wage/supervision relationship.
Although the above method may provide a valid attempt to re-
duce the endogeneity bias of the coeﬃcient of interest, to infer the
sign of the true wage/supervision relationship and to sort out al-
ternative theoretical explanations, it may not achieve identiﬁcation
of the true magnitude of the wage-supervision relationship. As dis-
cussed above for identiﬁcation one needs exogenous and independent
variation in the causing variable of interest (here supervision inten-
sity), whereas our analysis exploits a diﬀerent source of variation.
In particular, we exploit variationi ns u p e r v i s i o ni n t e n s i t yg e n -
erated by regional and industry variation in the skilled/unskilled
wage diﬀe r e n t i a lw h i c hi nt u r n sp r o d u c e sv a r i a t i o ni nt h ec o s to fs u -
pervision across establishments. Other sources of variation we are
exploiting may be regional diﬀerences in the unemployment rate,
which according to the shirking model aﬀect the probability of ﬁnd-
ing a job and thus aﬀect the expected penalty of shirking and mon-
itoring intensity.
Having said all the above, and provided that we also face the same
problems hindering the estimation of the relationship between wages
and supervision as previous studies in the ﬁeld (Leonard 1987, Neal
1993, Brunello 1995, Ewing and Payne 1999), our main contribution
is to investigate the relationship between wages and supervision us-
ing establishment level data from the UK, and thus provide some
13fresh evidence in the existing literature.
3.1 Eﬃciency Wages
Under a continuous eﬀort version of the shirking model (Albrecht
and Vroman 1998), employee’s optimally chosen eﬀort is a function
of the wage and supervision intensity set by the employer, as well
as other factors:
e = e(w,N/L,R),e i> 0,e ii< 0,i= w,N/L,R (1)
,where w is the wage, N/L is the ratio of supervisors to workers
and R are all other factors that aﬀect the intensity of eﬀort chosen
by employees.26 By ﬁxing eﬀort to a certain level, the wage can be
expressed as an implicit function of monitoring intensity as well as
all other factors that aﬀect eﬀort. This wage function is given by:
w = f(N/L,e∗,R)( 2 )
,w h e r ee∗ can be thought as the level of required eﬀort by the ﬁrm.
Equation (2) is the equation of the contour of the eﬀort function that
deﬁnes the set of ﬁrm’s isoeﬀort curves. It can be easily shown that
isoeﬀo r tc u r v e ss l o p ed o w n w a r d si n(w,N/L) space, as the derivative






< 0( 3 )
P r o v i d e dt h es h a p eo ft h ei s o e ﬀort curves and the fact that the
representative ﬁrm will choose wages, supervision as well as other
human resource practices to minimize the costs of a unit of labour
that provides the target eﬀort e∗,t h eo p t i m a lw a g e - s u p e r v i s i o nd e -
termination is illustrated in ﬁgure 1. The wage-supervision relation-
ship illustrated in ﬁgure 1 is determined for given all other factors
that aﬀect the intensity of eﬀort R (other personnel policy practices
that aﬀect eﬀort such as screening and motivation mechanisms) in
the ﬁrm, which further suggests that inability to observe and control
f o rt h e s ef a c t o r sw i l lg e n e r a t ea nu p w a r db i a si nt h er e l a t i o n s h i po f
interest (see also Rebitzer 1995).
26Note that these factors can be endogenous to the ﬁr ma sf o re x a m p l eo t h e rh u m a nr e s o u r c e
practices (recruitment and motivation practices, etc.) or exogenous, as the discount rate, the








Figure 1: The effect of a change in effort determinants R in the optimal level 
of wages and supervision.
Note that according to the latter argument endogeneity may re-
sult because of unobserved factors that aﬀect the choice of wage and
supervision by ﬁrms with the same eﬀort requirements. Moreover,
ﬁrms may diﬀer in terms of the eﬀo r tt a r g e tt h e ys e tf o rm a n yr e a -
sons27 and therefore may require that their employees work harder
and thus choose higher wages and supervision intensity.
Thus, the above example illustrates that under the eﬃciency
wages shirking rationale, the main omitted variables are required
eﬀo r ta tt h eﬁrm level or/and eﬀort inﬂuencing variables, as for
example other personnel and human resource practices and the en-
27For example ﬁrms that consider product quality as a competitive advantage they will
require employees to work harder and thus set higher wages and supervision (Kruse 1992).
Similarly, businesses for which there is highe rh a z a r do nt h ej o bw i l lr e q u i r em o r ec a u t i o n
and diligence by their employees which can be interpreted as higher eﬀort which again can
be achieved by more tight supervision and higher wages. Finally, in establishments where
shirking costs are higher than elsewhere and if shirking is viewed as withheld and thus lower
eﬀort, it is optimal that managers use more stringent supervision and pay higher wages so
that to ensure that eﬀort is suﬃciently high.
15dogeneity bias is expected to be positive and thus will mask any
underlying wage-supervision trade-oﬀ that may be in operation.
This is not surprising as according to the shirking model the
predicted negative relationship between wages and supervision is
generated for everything else constant and in particular for given
eﬀort. Therefore, if the shirking model is true, controlling for eﬀort
diﬀerences as well as factors that may inﬂuence eﬀort intensity across
ﬁrms is important as it enables one to trace-out the wage-supervision
trade-oﬀ along an isoeﬀort curve and if this is not done the result
will be an upward bias in the relationship of interest.28
Another equivalent theoretical approach to the estimation of the
wage-monitoring intensity relationship has been to start with a pro-
d u c t i o nf u n c t i o ni ne ﬃcient labour units, deﬁne the equation of the
isoquants in (w,N/L) s p a c ea n du s et h a tt oe x p r e s st h ew a g ea sa n
implicit function of monitoring intensity and other factors that aﬀect
output.
The production function is given by:
Q = Q[e(w,N/L) ∗ L],Q i > 0,Q ii < 0,i= e ∗ L, (4)
If we hold output constant and provided that the functional form
of the eﬀort function allows to explicitly solve for wages, then the
wage can be expressed by the following equation:
w = g(N/L,Q∗,L), (5)
,w h e r eQ∗is the ﬁxed level of output. It is easy to infer that the
slope of the isoquants in (w,N/L) space is negative.29 Nevertheless,
as in the case discussed above, and given that the true technological
relationship has as postulated in equation (4), inability to control for
output as well as employment30 will shift the relationship between
wages and supervision intensity resulting in upward biased estimates
of the wage-supervision relationship.
This latter approach is used by Leonard (1987) who also suggests
that there will be an upward bias in the estimate of interest in the
case one does not control for output or other unobserved factors af-
fecting output. Leonard uses employment to control for output and
he implicitly suggests that the fact that he estimates wage equations
28This argument is also demonstrated by the theoretical developed model in chapter 2, where
after an exogenous increase in the wage because of the imposition of a binding minimum wage,
and given that eﬀort is continuous and is not held constant, employers increase monitoring
intensity. In other words, employers who want to increase the eﬀort level they will use higher
wages and more intensive supervision.
29In particular it is exactly the same as the slope of the isoeﬀort curves, derived in the
previous section.
30Even if one controls for output, diﬀerences in employment across ﬁrms will also generate
diﬀerences in the eﬀort required to produce a given output which again leads to an upward
bias in the wage-supervision relationship.
16for narrowly deﬁned occupations may limit any unobserved hetero-
geneity across ﬁrms that may cause an upward bias. However, ﬁrst
of all employment may not be a good proxy for output (Groshen
and Krueger 1990) and second there may still exist some unob-
served heterogeneity in narrowly deﬁned occupations across ﬁrms
(for example diﬀerent eﬀort requirements for ﬁrm-speciﬁcr e a s o n s )
t h a tm a ye x p l a i nw h yL e o n a r dﬁnds positive but insigniﬁcant eﬀects
of supervision on wages as a positive endogeneity bias may mask the
wage-supervision trade-oﬀ. An alternative way to deal with the out-
put bias when one follows this latter approach, could be to control
for both eﬀort and employment in order to identify any trade-oﬀ
between wages and supervision along an isoquant.31
Even in the case that one controls for both output and employ-
ment, the trade-oﬀ between wages and supervision intensity may not
be traced out along an isoquant, as diﬀerent ﬁrms may have diﬀerent
eﬀort and/or production technologies.32 Given, that the latter argu-
ment is true this would mean that ﬁr m sw i t hm o r er e s p o n s i v ee ﬀort,
provided everything else is the same, will use both higher wages and
more supervision, fact which generates an additional positive bias in
the estimate of interest. Therefore, one needs not only to control for
the level of eﬀo r tb u ta l s of o rd i ﬀerences in the eﬀort function across
ﬁrms. The question of interest thus becomes also how one could de-
termine potential ways to control for eﬀort technology diﬀerences
across ﬁrms.
Gordon (1994) conducted a cross-country analysis on variation
of supervision intensity and suggested that wages and supervision
are more eﬀective in inducing motivation and eﬀort in some coun-
tries, because of cross-national diﬀerences on the systems that gov-
31Controling for both eﬀort and employment, given that the production function is as
postulated by equation (4), is equivalent to controling for output, provided also that the
eﬀort and production technology is the same across ﬁrms. The usefulness of this approach is
that it can be used to trace out the trade-oﬀ along an isoquant, without being necessary to
explicitly control for output in the abscence of data on output and when data on eﬀort and
employment are available.
32Suppose that ﬁrms do not diﬀer in the production technology but diﬀer in the eﬀort
technology only, i.e. the eﬀort function is diﬀererent across ﬁrms or alternatively the respon-
siveness of eﬀort in the wage and supervision is diﬀerent for diﬀerent ﬁrms. In this case if
we keep output and employment ﬁxed, given the same production technology in all ﬁrms we
also control for eﬀort level, because if all ﬁrms have the same output target and use the same
amount of labour then they should also use the same level of eﬀort to achieve the output
target, given production technology is the same across ﬁrms. However, if ﬁrms diﬀer in the
eﬀort technology, they will use a diﬀerent mix of the wage and supervision intensity to achieve
the same eﬀort level, and it is quite intuitive why the more eﬀort productive ﬁrms will use less
of both wage and supervision to achieve the given eﬀort level. This is an intuitive explanation
of why we expect that diﬀerences in eﬀort technology can be another source of a positive bias
in the relationship between wages and supervision. We discuss a way to control for diﬀerences
in eﬀort technology in this section. Similarly, diﬀerences in production technology (assume
eﬀort technology the same across ﬁrms for simplicity), across ﬁrms can cause shifts and thus
a positive bias in the relationship between wages and supervision.
17ern labour relations. Particularly, Gordon (1994) points out that
diﬀerences in labour management institutions and work norms may
generate diﬀerences in the eﬀectiveness of carrots and sticks as in-
centive devices.
The relevant literature, is using either continuous or categorical
diﬀerences across economies in order to distinguish between ‘corpo-
ratist’ and ‘competitive’ systems or ‘cooperative’ and ‘conﬂictual’
regimes of labour relations respectively (Gordon 1990). One should
expect heavy reliance of conﬂictual regimes on wages and super-
vision and lower reliance on these devices in cooperative regimes
(Gordon 1994).
Gordon’s factor analysis results suggested that out of many struc-
tural characteristics of labour relations systems two factors were
those with the highest explanatory power. The ﬁrst factor was la-
b e l l e da sa ni n d e xo f “ i n c o m ea n dj o bs e c u r i t y ” ,s i n c eh i g hs c o r e so n
this factor indicate low inter-industry wage dispersion, high govern-
ment commitment to health services, an active government labour
market policy, relatively high union-density, and reasonable pro-
tection against layoﬀs (including prenotiﬁcation, maximum weeks
of unemployment beneﬁts, and mandatory severance beneﬁts). The
second factor was labeled as a measure of “worker bargaining power”
since it loads most highly on the degree of coordination of union bar-
gaining, mandatory prenotiﬁcation and union density. Based on the
literature, we would expect economic systems with higher indices of
“income and job security” and “worker bargaining power” to feature
relatively more “cooperative” where we should expect lower respon-
siveness of eﬀort on the carrot (the wage) and the stick (supervision
intensity). Thus, the idea is to try to control for ﬁrms’ features or
characteristics that may indicate whether labour relations is of a
“conﬂictual” or of a “cooperative” type (see the data section).
As in the case of Leonard (1987) the above discussion regarding
the direction of the endogeneity bias casts doubt on the ﬁndings
of some of the most cited attempts to estimate the relationship be-
tween wages and supervision and may also explain why these studies
rendered inconclusive (Fitzroy and Kraft, 1986, Neal 1993, Brunello
1995).
One of the main objectives of the above analysis is to emphasise
that the ‘shirking’ and ‘gift-exchange’ models are predicting a wage-
supervision trade-oﬀ, ceteris paribus. Therefore, one cannot dismiss
eﬃciency wages in favour of alternative theories33 if he/she cannot
33Theories that are consistent with a positive relationship between wages and supervision
are: a) equalizing diﬀerences models (Rosen 1986), where supervision is considered by em-
ployees as a ‘bad’ working condition and thus, ceteris paribus, employees should be paid a
compensating wage-diﬀerential, when they are supervised more stringently. b) Eﬀort disci-
pline (Bowles 1985, Bowles and Boyer 1988) models, where the wage and supervision are
viewed as complements in inducing eﬀort, as an increase in the wage cannot induce eﬀort,
18ﬁnd a negative relationship between wages and supervision, unless
ﬁrstly he/she explicitly controls for all required factors.34
This is something that seems not to be explicitly suggested in
many studies in the ﬁeld. An exception is the fast-food industry
study presented by Krueger (1991), who argues that fast food jobs
are highly homogeneous in skills and performance requirements and
thus there is limited scope for unobserved heterogeneity across fast
food outlets that could bias the estimate of interest.
Additionally, Groshen and Krueger (1990), implicitly assume that
given that they examine the wage-supervision relationship for nar-
rowly deﬁned occupations, eﬀort requirements or other related unob-
served factors should not vary much for the same occupation across
hospitals. However, they do ﬁnd a signiﬁcant hospital speciﬁce f -
fect on wages, which could be explained also by diﬀerences in eﬀort
requirements across hospitals. If diﬀerences in eﬀort requirements
is a valid explanation for the hospital speciﬁce ﬀect on wages, and
if there are valid eﬃciency wages considerations, then we should
expect that there would be also a positive hospital speciﬁce ﬀect
on supervision. In fact this eﬀect is not documented by Groshen
a n dK r u e g e rb u tt h i si sn o tb e c a u s ed i ﬀerences in the intensity of
eﬀort is not a potential explanation, but because of minimum su-
pervision intensity requirements which are imposed by state and
federal government across areas, and constrain optimal adjustments
of supervision intensity.
3.2 Employees Quality Sorting
Another theoretical explanation of a negative relationship between
wages and supervision is provided by the so-called “sorting by abil-
ity” model which is based on the assumption that more able em-
ployees that are paid higher wages could be left more autonomy on
the job as they need less guidance and coordination. Therefore, un-
if it is not accompanied by supervision increases, because dismissal threats are not credible
unless there is suﬃcient monitoring. c) Product diﬀerentiation theories as ﬁrms that are more
concerned about the quality of their product will pay higher wages and supervise employees
more stringently (Kruse 1992), d) Finally, occupational diﬀerences may also explain a positive
relationship between wages and supervision, because in some occupations employees are paid
higher wages and are supervised more tightly (this happens usually when there is high-risk in
terms of safety, as for example in the Petrochemical industry (Rebitzer 1995)).
34In general, the eﬃciency wage eﬀe c tc a nw o r kt h r o u g hi n r e a s e dm o t i v a t i o nb u ta l s o
through improved quality of the workforce. Therefore, for the econometrician to be able
to trace-out the trade-oﬀ between wages and supervision, he/she must control for both em-
ployees performance and quality diﬀerences. This argument is also demonstrated in Georgiadis
(2001), where a positive relationship between wages and supervision is the case, in a shirk-
ing model with heterogeneous workers and/or continuous eﬀort, as an increase in the wage
enables the ﬁrm to improve the quality of the workforce and/or increase eﬀort on the job.
Therefore it is also important to control also for employees heterogeneity, when estimating
the wage-supervision relationship.
19der this theory, proﬁt maximizing employers will increase the wage
up to the point where the improvement in employees’ quality will
be such that the increase in wage costs is exactly oﬀset by a fall in
supervision costs (Groshen and Krueger 1990). Thus, this model is
not only consistent with a wage-supervision trade-oﬀ but also pre-
dicts that in equilibrium wage costs should be oﬀset by supervision
costs which is exactly what is predicted by the shirking model of
eﬃciency wages.
Therefore, under this theoretical framework, unobserved diﬀer-
ences in employees’ quality across ﬁrms or establishments will lead to
a negative bias in the wage-supervision relationship. Therefore, un-
less one ﬁnds a valid instrument or eﬀectively controls for employees’
ability it is hard to conclude that any evidence on a wage-supervision
trade-oﬀ provides evidence in support of eﬃciency wages. However,
note that if the true relationship between wages and supervision is
as the “sorting by ability” model postulates, then if one controls
for employees’ quality then the wage supervision relationship is ex-
pected to be positive.35
The close observational equivalence between the “sorting by abil-
ity” and eﬃciency wages theories with respect to the wage-supervision
trade-oﬀ not only causes problems in sorting out the two models in
the light of evidence supporting a trade-oﬀ but has a result the
problem to persist even if one shows that wage increases pay for
themselves by lower supervision costs, which is an extra condition
used to test whether employers pay eﬃciency wages (Levine 1992,
Rebitzer 1995). The only diﬀerence between the two models seems
to be the fact that for eﬃciency wages, wages and supervision are
eﬀort/productivity eliciting devices and the trade-oﬀ is predicted ce-
teris paribus, whereas in the “sorting by ability” model, wages and
supervision interact through any quality adjustments in the work-
force, and the trade-oﬀ is the case for varying employees’ ability
across ﬁrms.36
35In the ‘sorting by ability’ model ‘isoability’ curves slope upwards in the wage-monitoring
i n t e n s i t ys p a c eb e c a u s ea ni n c r e a s ei nt h ew a g em u s tb ef o l l o w e db ya ni n c r e a s ei ns u p e r v i s i o n
intensity in order for ability to be constant. This is because on the one hand an increase
in the wage increases average ability of the workforce because enables employers to employ
more able workers, but on the other hand an increase in supervision intensity will enable the
employer to substitute less able for more able employees, to keep average employees’ quality
constant, as less able workers need to be supervised more stringently. If one does not control
for diﬀerences in employees quality/ability across establishments and provided that the sorting
by ability model is true, this will generate shifts in the isoability curves across establishments
which will have as a result a negative relationship between wages and supervision to be traced
out.
36The theoretical model of chapter 2 assumes heterogeneous employees in terms of their
innate inclination to shirk and predicts that an increase in the wage will have as an eﬀect
that the marginal worker will have higher disutility of eﬀort compared to the situation before
the wage increase. Moreover, the wage increase will aﬀect the distribution of characteristic
between workers and shirkers and increase the average inclination to shirk of workers com-
pared to that of shirkers. Therefore the wage-supervision trade-oﬀ is predicted under this
203.3 Unions
In this subsection we oﬀer another but novel explanation of
the wage-supervision trade-oﬀ, based on the premise that wages
and supervision are the result of ﬁrm-union collective bargaining
arrangements.
In particular, the analysis is based on the theoretical framework
presented in Georgiadis (2001) with a suitable extension to include
union-ﬁrm bargaining over eﬀort. In Georgiadis (2001), the ﬁrm’s
objective is to maximise proﬁts subject to the non-shirking condition
which expresses average eﬀort (the non-shirking condition can also
express the proportion of non-shirkers, under this framework) as
a function of the wage and supervision intensity as well as other
factors.
In the absence of unions, the ﬁrm’s problem is:
max
w,N,L
Π = f(θ ∗ L) − wL− cN (6)
s.t θ = θ(w,N/L,R)( 7 )
,w h e r eθ is the average eﬀort which depends on the wage w,m o n i -
toring intensity as captured by the supervisor to staﬀ ratio N/L and
other exogenous parameters that aﬀect workers inclination to shirk
R (worker’s outside option, discount rate, quit rate etc.). For expo-
sitional purposes and for simplicity we will assume that the ﬁrm’s
objective is to maximise proﬁts per employee. Under the simpliﬁed
assumption of constant returns to scale in eﬃcient labour units and
after substituting (7) to (6) the ﬁrm’s problem becomes:
max
w,N/L




, which implies that ﬁrm’s problem can be reduced in choosing the
wage and monitoring intensity and in this way average eﬀort to
maximise proﬁts per worker π.
On the other hand, we will assume that union’s objective is to
maximise the average utility of unionised workers that are employed
by the ﬁrm. Therefore, union’s utility or objective function can be
expressed by the following equation:
V = w − θ(w,N/L)( 9 )
,w h e r ew i st h ew a g eo ft h ea v e r a g ee m p l o y e ei nt h eﬁrm, which
is equal to the wage set by the ﬁrm, as in the model developed in
Georgiadis (2001) all workers are paid the same wage and θ is the
average eﬀort in the ﬁrm. Therefore, given the objective functions
framework for given average eﬀort in the ﬁrm (or proportion of non-shirkers) and average
“quality”/characteristic of workers.
21of both parties and provided also that both parties have a zero
fallback, the solution of the bargaining game37 will be the solution
of the following maximisation problem:
max
w,N/L
Ω = V α ∗ πβ (10)
,w h e r eΩis known as the Nash maximand (Nash 1950, 1953) and α,
βare parameters that capture union’s and ﬁrm’s bargaining power
respectively (usually dependent on the two parties discount rates
and outside options).
As it may be the case that some times unions bargain over man-
ning ratios, for example the level at which machines or oﬃces are
manned or sometimes in trains or ships the crew size, or in general
how hard workers have to work, it is reasonable to assume that the
union and the ﬁrm bargain over eﬀort,38 w h i c hi sa na p p r o a c ho f t e n
adopted also by others ( Layard Nickell and Jackman 1991).
For our purpose, which is to predict any eﬀects that may arise
from bargaining between unions and employers, under eﬃciency
wages considerations, on the wage-supervision intensity relationship,
it is suﬃcient to provide a diagrammatic illustration of the bargain-
ing solution (see ﬁgure 2). Therefore, given that the union and the
ﬁrm bargain over average eﬀort which in turn is determined by the
level of the wage and monitoring intensity, the bargaining solution
can be illustrated in the (w,N/L) space. It is easy to show that the
contours of the ﬁrm’s objective function are elliptic, as the indif-
ference curves are arising from satiated preferences. Moreover, as
we explained previously, because of the wage-supervision intensity
trade-oﬀ,f o rg i v e ne ﬀort, we expect that the average isoeﬀort curves
slope downwards in (w,N/L) space.
Finally, it can be shown that union’s indiﬀerence curves slope
upwards in (w,N/L) space,39 which is derived from union’s objec-
tive function, that postulates that unions “like” wages and “dislike”
supervision.
As, it is shown in ﬁgure 2,40 if there is an increase in the union’s
bargaining power, we expect that the outcome of the bargaining
process will involve higher wage and lower supervision intensity
and probably lower average eﬀort, as the equilibrium shifts in a
37This is the standard alternating oﬀer bargaining game over the division of a pie between
two parties, under full information on both sides about the payoﬀs to the other side.
38The fact that unions bargain over wages and supervision intensity which determine the
level of eﬀort also imply that unions implicitly bargain over the determinaton of eﬀort.






1−θw ,w h i c hi sp o s i t i v ea sθN/L is positive as eﬀort is increasing in supervision inten-
sity, and it can be also shown that θw < 1, by chapter 2.
40We use P to denote the ﬁrm’s eliptic isoproﬁt curves, u for unions indiﬀerences curves
and e for isoeﬀo r tc u r v e si nt h e( W , N / L )s p a c e .
22higher union indiﬀerence curve. This result implies that diﬀerences
in union’s bargaining power across unionised ﬁrms may cause a neg-
ative bias in the wage-supervision intensity, which may be another












Figure 2: The determination of the wage and supervision by union-firm bargaining and
the ‘union-power’ bias.
Thus, under this theoretical framework the main variable is the
union’s bargaining power which if omitted from the wage speciﬁ-
cation the result will be a downward bias in the wage-supervision
relationship. This result may cast doubt on the ﬁndings of empiri-
cal studies that suggested that their evidence of a wage-supervision
trade-oﬀ are made more compelling by the fact that any omitted
variable bias is expected to be positive (Leonard 1987, Ewing and
Payne 1999).
41This prediction holds, under the assumption that union’s objective function is such that
unions “like” wages and “dislike” supervision.
23In conclusion, we show that under reasonable assumptions, union-
ﬁrm bargaining may oﬀer another explanation, of the wage-supervision
trade-oﬀ, which is something that should be also taken seriously in
mind and hasn’t been addressed by any previous study in the topic.
3.4 Equalizing Diﬀerences and Workers Prefer-
ences over Supervision
In the previous section we show how union’s preferences over wages
and supervision may explain the wage-supervision trade-oﬀ when
unions bargain over wages and/or working conditions (supervision
and eﬀort intensity).
The theory of equalizing diﬀerences explains observed wage-dispersion
across ﬁrms and establishments by postulating that workers must
receive a wage-diﬀerential in order to be compensated for diﬀeren-
tial working conditions across ﬁrms. In our case this simply implies
that if supervision intensity is viewed by workers as an important
feature of working conditions in the establishment, then workers’
preferences over supervision intensity will determine the level and
diﬀerences in compensation across establishments.
If for example workers “dislike” supervision because they “dis-
like” eﬀort and because in the presence of supervision they have to
supply more eﬀort than in the absence of supervision (Groshen and
Krueger 1990) then employees working in ﬁrms with higher super-
vision should receive higher wages, ceteris paribus. According to
Groshen and Krueger (1990) another reason why employees ‘dislike’
monitoring is because they may consider it as a disagreeable intru-
sion in their privacy and independence. Therefore, if supervision is
viewed by employees simply as a bad working condition and not as
a motivation device, then a positive relationship between wages and
supervision is the case.
On the other hand if workers “like” supervision because for ex-
ample tight supervision enables them to achieve job goals (Groshen
and Krueger 1990) then a negative wage diﬀerential must be paid
to employees in establishments where supervision is more intensive.
Therefore another explanation of the wage-supervision trade-oﬀ can
be provided by equalizing diﬀerences theory, under the assumption
that supervision is a ‘good’ working condition.
The above discussion is based on homogeneous employees’ pref-
erences over supervision. Under the case where employees’ have
heterogeneous preferences over supervision intensity then the sign
o ft h ew a g ed i ﬀerential paid by employers depends on the preferences
of the marginal worker (Groshen and Krueger 1990).42 All in all, the
42If one assumes that all employees either ‘like’ or ‘dislike’ supervision but the extent they
24main point of this section is that another interpretation of the wage-
supervision trade-oﬀ m a yb ep r o v i d e db ye q u a l i z i n gd i ﬀerences the-
ory under unobserved employees preferences, when employees ‘like’
supervision.
3.5 Principal-Agent Theories
T h ef a c tt h a tt h e r ee x i s tm a n yd i ﬀerent theoretical explanations43 of
the wage-supervision trade-oﬀ suggests that even if one provides con-
sistent evidence that support the wage-supervision trade-oﬀ doesn’t
necessarily mean that this evidence provide also support to eﬃciency
wages. However, even in the case where all alternative to eﬃciency
wages explanations of the wage-supervision trade-oﬀ are ruled out,
the ﬁndings should be still interpretedw i t hc a u t i o n .P r o v i d e dt h a t
all alternative explanations have been dismissed the most plausible
interpretation of a negative wage-supervision relationship should be
as supporting one of the tenets of eﬃciency wages that wages and
supervision are substitutes in inducing employee eﬀort and motiva-
tion.
Even in this case, this ﬁnding is not suﬃcient to provide support
to eﬃciency wages as the trade-oﬀ between wages and supervision
arising from agency problems is also predicted by agency theories
many of which do not share the eﬃciency wages property.44
Therefore testing if there is a wage-supervision trade-oﬀ and
showing that the trade-oﬀ arises because of agency problems is
equivalent as testing a necessary but not suﬃcient condition for
eﬃciency wages as this provides only indirect evidence of eﬀects
of wages on employees’ productivity. The latter is a fundamental
assumption of eﬃciency wages but another fundamental feature or
implication of eﬃciency wages is that employers ﬁnd it optimal to
set the wage unilaterally above the market clearing wage in order to
maximize proﬁts.
Therefore, in order to test for eﬃciency wages one needs to show
ﬁrstly that a wage-supervision trade-oﬀ e x i s t sa n dt h e nt h a tt h e
do that varies across employees, then the sign of the wage diﬀerential depends on the nature
of preferences of employees over supervision, whereas the magnitude of any wage diﬀerential
depends on the extent the marginal worker ‘likes’or ‘dislikes’ supervision.
43Another explanation of the wage-supervision trade-oﬀ m a yb ep r o v i d e db yu n o b s e r v e d
occupational diﬀerences across ﬁrms, that lead to lower wages and higher supervision (Goldin
1986, Kruse 1992). By unobserved occupational diﬀerences we mean any occupational diﬀer-
ences that are not due to diﬀerences in eﬀort requirements or/and employees’ quality across
establishments, which are expected to be picked up by any employees’ quality and eﬀort
controls.
44Eﬃciency wages should be seen as a special case of principal-agent theories of motivation,
where there is a lower bound in the compensation the agent can receive under any state.
In other words the distinguishing feature of eﬃciency wages is that wages are set above the
market clearing wage.
25trade-oﬀ is consistent with a principal-agent wage and not any al-
ternative rationale. The latter test will reveal whether wages aﬀect
workers’ productive behaviour, which if holds then one needs also
to test whether wages are set optimally to elicit the required pro-
ductive behaviour by employees by testing whether the costs from
wage increases are oﬀset by a fall in supervision costs.
4 Other Considerations
4.1 Substitution of Supervisors for Workers
Furthermore, on the endogeneity problem related to the supervisor-
staﬀ ratio, Groshen and Krueger (1990), using a standard minimi-
sation argument and a standard Cobb-Douglas production function
depending on supervisory and labour inputs, they show that an
i n c r e a s ei nt h ew a g ew i l li n c r e a s et h es u p e r v i s o r / s u p e r v i s e er a t i o ,
in any case where the production technology allows for a non-zero
marginal rate of substitution between supervision and employment,
because of substitution of supervisors for workers,45 leading to a
positive bias in the estimate of the relationship between wage and
supervision. It is very intuitive why this is the case under Groshen
and Krueger’s chosen setting as the wage is exogenous and does not
aﬀect productivity, and that is why an increase in the wage ren-
ders labour input relatively more cheap than the supervisory input
leading to substitution of supervisors for workers.
Nevertheless, if we instead assume that the underlying technol-
ogy is as postulated in (4), where output depends on eﬃcient labour
units, and if we assume that the wage is given because for example
of a binding minimum wage in the labour market, the same minimi-
sation argument can be used to show that, it may be also the case,
that an exogenous increase in the wage, may also decrease the super-
visor to staﬀ ratio, depending on the responsiveness of the marginal
product of labour relative to the marginal product of supervision
w.r.t the wage).46
45This argument is based on the fact that the production function is of the standard neoclas-
sical type, with supervision and labour the only direct and non-inferior inputs to production,
a n dw i t hg i v e ni n p u tp r i c e st ot h eﬁrm. Under this framework, an exogenous increase in the
wage tilts the isocost so that the tangency with the isoquant of the target output is at a point
at which more supervisory input is used relative to labour input.
46In Georgiadis (2001) the eﬀect of the wage on the marginal product of both labour and
supervision is ambiguous, but it can be shown that they are moving always in the same
direction. In the case that both marginal products increase, it is shown that the changes are
such that the supervisor/supervisee relative use in production must be increased. In the case,
where both marginal products are decreasing then the change in the supervisor-to staﬀ ratio
depends on the relative responsiveness of the marginal product of labour and supervision w.r.t
the wage. However, it is shown that other restrictions is the reason why the ratio of supervisor
to staﬀ increases even under this latter case.
26If we assume that the production technology is given by equation







,where MPL and MPN are the marginal product of employment
and supervision and w and c a r et h ep r i c eo fl a b o u ra n ds u p e r v i -
sion respectively, which we assume that they are given. Under this
case, both the MPL and MPN are dependent on the wage. Suppose
now that the wage is given by a minimum wage (see Georgiadis,
2001).47 An increase in the wage, has an ambiguous eﬀect on the
supervisor/supervisee ratio, as the change depends on the relative
responsiveness of MPL and MPN t ot h ew a g ei n c r e a s e .
The main aim of this section is to show that the prediction of
Groshen and Krueger (1990) hinges heavily on the particular theo-
retical setting they use at which the wage is exogenous, whereas
under eﬃciency wages as well in empirical studies of the wage-
supervision trade-oﬀ the wage is treated as endogenous.
Moreover, we show that, under eﬃciency wages and in the spe-
cial case the wage is increased exogenously the eﬀect on the super-
visor/supervisee is ambiguous. Finally, it is important also to point
out that under the eﬃciency wage framework, even if the produc-
tion function allows for substitution of supervisors for workers an
increase in the wage will result in a fall in the ratio of supervisors
to workers, if eﬀort is held constant. This argument suggests that,
given that the production function is as postulated by (4), controlling
for eﬀort will prevent any substitution eﬀect to mask an underlying
wage-supervision trade-oﬀ.
4.2 Measurement Error
Other problems associated with the trade-oﬀ are measurement
error problems related to the use of supervisor to staﬀ ratio. In
particular, Rebitzer (1995) argues that supervisors do not have a
solely monitoring responsibility on the job and there are supervisory
workers that do not have any monitoring role at all and thus the
supervising to supervised employees ratio overstates the intensity of
monitoring.
Actually, we believe that this is mainly a problem of deﬁnition
and even if monitoring is not the only task of supervisory employees
who may contribute explicitly to production, it remains their main
task and thus the supervisor to staﬀ ratio is expected to be highly
47Otherwise this argument cannot be applied as the wage is endogenous in eﬃciency wages
models.
27correlated with the extend of monitoring (Odiorne 1963, Gordon
1990 and 1994).48
Finally, Brunello (1995) considered quantity of supervision, rep-
resented by the supervisor to staﬀ ratio, as only one dimension of
monitoring, and suggested that quality of supervision should be
also taken into account. After ﬁnding that the inclusion of quality
in wage equations abates the wage-supervision trade-oﬀ concludes
that measurement error in the main variables should stressed out as
another major problem that hinders the identiﬁcation of the rela-
tionship of interest. However, in the case that one ﬁnds a negative
estimate of the wage-supervision relationship, and provided that
measurement error attenuates the estimate of interest, the trade-oﬀ
becomes more compelling (see estimation section).
5T h e D a t a
The data set we used is drawn from the British Workplace In-
dustrial Relations Survey (WIRS) of 1990. This establishment-level
survey provides information on a sample of more than two thousands
establishments, with 25 or more employees, from almost all sectors
of the UK economy. Except of the fact the data are not drawn from
a speciﬁc sector and thus any results can be generalised, another
strength of the WIRS data is that it includes information on super-
vision, wages and other determinants of wages that are important
for our analysis.
In particular, the workforce is decomposed into manual and non-
manual employees, where the manual workers category is further de-
composed by skill (unskilled, semi-skilled and skilled) and the non-
manual is decomposed by occupation (managers, technicians, super-
visors/foremen etc.). In the subcategory of supervisors/foremen are
included all supervisors/foremen of manual workers and adminis-
trative/clerical workers with supervisory responsibilities. This cate-
gory excludes all non-manual workers with other responsibilities and
some supervisory responsibilities as well, fact which suggests that
includes all non-manual workers with primary and main duties the
supervision of manual/clerical workforce. Therefore, the monitoring
intensity proxy we construct is the ratio of supervisors/ foremen to
the total number of manual and clerical workers.49
48Gordon (1990) deﬁnes supervisory inputs as those wage-and-salary employees of a ﬁrm
with considerable if not primary responsibility for monitoring the labor eﬀort of those below
them in the ﬁrm’s hierarchy, especially including the labour eﬀort of production workers.
49We believe that the WIRS deﬁnition of the supervisor /foremen category limits concerns
for the standard measurement error problem, where the supervisor to staﬀ ratio is expected
to overestimate the extent of monitoring, as foremen of manual workers and clerical workers
with supervisory responsibilities have as a main task the monitoring and inspection of manual
and clerical employees. Thus, given the WIRS 1990 deﬁnitions, the supervisors to staﬀ ratio
28The focus of attention in this paper will be on the determination
of wages of the three diﬀerent skill categories of manual workers.
Note that even though WIRS is a survey of 2061 establishments,
wages are reported for the majority gender in each skill group only
in establishments where there are more than ﬁve employees in skill
group.50
Another important strength of WIRS for the purpose of our anal-
ysis is that it oﬀers information on potential controls for workers’
eﬀort. Particularly in the management questionnaire includes infor-
mation on the ratio of all other costs share to labour costs share in
total costs which is often considered as a good proxy of the intensity
at which employees may work with capital equipment or machines
(Layard, Jackman and Nickell 1991) and therefore a good proxy for
the extent of shirking costs as smaller relative labour share is likely
to be associated with higher shirking costs,51 because this may im-
ply that workers may work with more expensive equipment than
establishments with larger relative labour share (Katz 1986).
On the other hand another proxy for eﬀort seems to be provided
by answers to questions on the intensity of work in the establishment
surveyed, relative to other establishments in the same industry.
The WIRS 90 includes detailed information on unions and collec-
tive bargaining arrangements as well as other features of labour and
industrial relations, which are essential in order to control for ‘ef-
fort technology’ and for diﬀerences in union bargaining power across
establishments. In order to measure diﬀerences in industrial rela-
tions regimes that determine the responsiveness of employees eﬀort
in the wage and supervision and thus some features of eﬀort technol-
ogy across establishments we use information of provision of extra
employees’ beneﬁts as sick pay over and above statutory require-
ments, free or subsidized food or meals, occupational pension and
a standard working week of less than 36 hours. Additionally, we
use also the proportion of employees dismissed for reasons other
than redundancy and the proportion of employees received disci-
plinary sanctions. We expect that these variables will pick up some
of the degree of conﬂict or cooperation that characterises labour-
management relations in the establishment and thus any diﬀerences
in the responsiveness of eﬀort in motivation devices, as the wage
and supervision.
Moreover, union power bias considerations, as suggested by the
in our case may not systematically overestimate monitoring intensity in the establishment.
50Considering also missing observations because of non-response even in establishments
with more than ﬁve employees in skill group or because of responses of “don’t know” or “non
applicability” of the particular question in some establishments, the remaining observations
on unskilled, semi-skilled and skilled median wages are 1232, 990 and 1105 respectively.
51Unobserved diﬀerences in shirking costs are expected to be the source of a positive bias
in the estimate of the elasticity of the wage with respect to supervision (Leonard 1987, Neal
1993).
29theoretical analysis in one of the previous sections may be particu-
larly valid in this case because a signiﬁcant proportion of establish-
m e n t si nW I R S9 0a r eu n i o n i s e db u ta l s ob e c a u s ei na ni m p o r t a n t
fraction of unionised establishments, unions negotiate not only over
pay and physical working conditions but also over manning and
staﬃng levels, recruitment, level of redundancy payments and other
issues.52 In order to control for diﬀerences in union bargaining power
across establishments we use a dummy for whether or not a recog-
nised union negotiates also over staﬃng and manning levels and
other issues for manual workers but also a dummy for the existence
of a closed shop.
The justiﬁcation of the choice of the closed shop dummy as a good
measure of diﬀerences in bargaining power is that union bargaining
strength comes in large part from the strike threat. A union with
a closed shop arrangement at a particular establishment will be in
a stronger position to call a strike than one without. A union’s
bargaining strength is reduced when there is a non-union pool of
suitably qualiﬁed labour that an employer can hire from to cut costs.
The likelihood of this is reduced and thus the bargaining strength
of the union increased, where there is a closed shop (Stewart 1987,
Stewart 1990, Machin, Stewart and Van Reenen 1993).
Our previous analysis also suggested that if the prediction of
the shirking model that wages and supervision are substitutes in
motivating employees then a positive bias is predicted to occur in
the estimate of the relationship of interest because of omission of
eﬀort intensity controls, as well as other human resource practices
that aﬀect eﬀort and thus the choice of wages and supervision by
personnel managers. The information included in WIRS allows us
also to construct controls for other motivation devices that may be
used in establishments and thus to verify the direction of the bias (if
any) generated by omitting these controls. In particular, WIRS 90
includes detailed information on merit pay across skill groups and
whether appraisal of employees is used for promotions or pay rises.
In our analysis that follows we also try to provide an alterna-
tive test of the wage-supervision trade-oﬀ based on the conjecture
that if there exist a wage-supervision trade-oﬀ in operation, then it
i sl i k e l yt ob em o r ep r o n o u n c e df o rﬁrms in the private sector and
non-unionised ﬁrms, as these ﬁrms are expected to be in a better
position to take advantage of the trade-oﬀ because of cost minimiz-
ing behaviour and greater ﬂexibility in adjusting pay and staﬀ levels
compared to unionised or/and public sector ﬁrms. This is the rea-
son why we also restrict estimation in this particular subsample of
ﬁrms, where the trade-oﬀ is expected to be more pronounced.
52Strikingly in 1047 out of 1236 unionised establishments there exist a recognised union
that negotiates not only over pay but also on staﬃng and manning levels and other issues as
suggested above.
30The focus on the sample of non-unionised and privately owned
establishments becomes even more appealing if one also considers
that the essence of eﬃciency wages is the unilateral (no other forces,
as unions are expected to aﬀect wage-determination) and optimal
(proﬁt maximising and cost minimising behaviour is more likely to
be the case in the private sector) setting of wages above the market-
clearing wage from employers.
An oﬀsetting weakness of the WIRS 1990 is the lack of detailed
information on employees quality and characteristics, as well as de-
tailed occupation information. However, we believe that the fact
that in our study we address the problem separately for the wages
of unskilled, semi-skilled and skilled manual workers should signif-
icantly reduce heterogeneity in worker quality or any unobserved
variation due to occupational diﬀerences. Finally, the use of other
controls that may capture the average human capital and technology
in the establishment also abates this problem.
6 Estimation
6.1 Unskilled
T a b l e s1t o3s u m m a r i s et h em a i ne s t i m a t i o nr e s u l t so fs e m i -
log wage equations for unskilled manual workers (see tables section
at the end). Estimated speciﬁcations are of the form of equation
(2), which is the equation of the isoeﬀort curve produced by the
production function.
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the median
weekly wage of the majority gender in the unskilled manual group53
and the main explanatory variables, except the supervisors to staﬀ
ratio, are some of the establishment characteristics (size, industry
aﬃliation, union recognition, ownership, etc.) that according to the
literature (Groshen 1991, Stewart 1987, 1990) are the main deter-
minants of inter-establishments wage diﬀerentials.
In table 1 we present estimation results for the full sample of
establishments in WIRS 1990. Results from the ﬁrst estimated
speciﬁcation suggest a positive but insigniﬁcant relationship be-
tween wages and the supervisor to staﬀ ratio, and a positive wage-
diﬀerential for unskilled manual workers in establishments that have
more employees (not reported in table 1),54 but also a positive wage
diﬀerential for employees in establishments that are in manufactur-
53The wage data are grouped into intervals and that is why wage equations are estimated
by maximum likelihood which, under broad conditions, produces consistent, asymptotically
normal and asymptotically eﬃcient estimates of the parameters of interest (Stewart 1983).
54The establishment size dummies are positive, monotonically increasing and jointly signif-
icant but individually insigniﬁcant.
31ing and in trading (private) sector as well as in establishments where
there is a recognised union.55
Speciﬁcation (2) includes also controls for the decomposition of
unskilled manual workforce in terms of gender and the decomposi-
tion of total manual workforce in terms of part-time status. Esti-
mates indicate that unskilled manual workers are paid on average
lower wages in establishments with higher proportion of female em-
ployees in the unskilled manual group, but the same is not the case
for establishments with higher proportion of part time manual work-
ers.56
In general controls for workforce characteristics may pick up dif-
ferences in observed average quality of unskilled manual employees
across establishments, and thus may provide an indication of any
unobserved employees’ quality/ability bias, provided that observed
workers’ quality characteristics are correlated with unobserved. Un-
der the latter assumption, the inclusion of employees’ quality con-
trols suggests that any unobserved ability or ‘employee quality’ bias
seems to be quite sizeable in magnitude, although the wage data
are from a relatively homogeneous group of workers across establish-
ments. Moreover, the change in the estimate of interest generated
by the inclusion of manual workforce’ characteristics suggests that
any unobserved employees’ quality bias is positive, in contrast to
the ‘sorting by ability’ model that predicts a negative unobserved
ability bias in the estimated coeﬃcient of monitoring intensity.57
Speciﬁcation (3) includes dummies for the ratio of all other costs
share to labour costs share in total costs which are expected to pick
up diﬀerences in eﬀort intensity or shirking costs across establish-
ments, as discussed in the previous section. The inclusion of the
eﬀort intensity (or shirking costs) proxies in speciﬁcation (3) results
in a downward change in the estimated coeﬃcient of the supervisor
to staﬀ ratio and seems to support our prediction that unobserved
diﬀerences in the intensity of eﬀort across establishments cause an
upward bias in the estimate of the wage-supervision relationship that
masks any wage-supervision trade-oﬀ. Moreover, the same doesn’t
55Note that coeﬃcients in models with grouped dependent variable are interpreted in the
standard OLS fashion (Stewart 1983).
56The estimated coeﬃcient of the proportion of part-time employees in the manual employ-
ees group is in the fringe of statistical signiﬁcance.
57Stewart (1983) showed that maximum likelihood estimators (MLEs) of the parameters of a
linear model, with a normal homoscedastic error, where the dependent variable is grouped, are
equivalent to OLS estimators of the parameters of the model produced by the regression of the
conditional mean of the dependent variable on the exogenous variables, where conditioning
is not only on exogenous variables but also on the interval in which the true value of the
dependent variable is included. The conditional mean is calculated based on an initial random
guess of values of estimated parameters and an iterated procedure is used up to convergence
in order to determine the optimal estimated parameters. Therefore, because of the OLS
equivalence of the MLE for the interval regression model, the standard OLS omitted variable
bias formula can be used in order to predict the direction of any omitted variable bias.
32seem to be the case when dummies for the intensity of work in the
establishment, as reported by manual workers representative in the
workplace, are also included in the estimated speciﬁcation (see spec-
iﬁcation (4) in table 1).58
Similarly, we ﬁnd that the inclusion of controls for diﬀerences
in ‘eﬀort technology’ and of controls for the use of other personnel
policies that aim to motivate employees does not cause a signiﬁcant
change in the coeﬃcient of interest, as implied by estimation results
for speciﬁcation (5) and (6) of table 1.59
Therefore, as the pattern of change in the coeﬃcient of supervi-
sor to staﬀ ratio doesn’t seem to indicate any sign of support of a
wage-supervision trade-oﬀ i nt h ec a s eo ft h ef u l l — s a m p l eo fe s t a b -
l i s h m e n t s( e x c e p to fs o m ee v i d e n c ei nf a v o u ro fa nu p w a r de ﬀort in-
tensity bias), as suggested by our analysis in the previous sections,
we next turn to present estimation results from private (trading)
sector establishments.
T h ef o c u st ot h ep r i v a t es e c t o ri sj u s t i ﬁed by the discussion in
the previous section which suggests that if the wage-supervision
trade-oﬀ is a result of cost-minimising behaviour of ﬁrms, as im-
plied by the shirking but also by the ‘sorting by ability’ model, then
a wage-supervision trade-oﬀ is expected to be more pronounced in
private sector establishments which are more likely to exhibit a cost-
minimising behaviour compared to establishments in the public sec-
tor.
Estimation results for the trading sector are presented in table
2. In this case the pattern of change in the coeﬃcient of interest
across diﬀerent speciﬁcations which gradually include controls for
workforce characteristics, eﬀort intensity, eﬀort technology as well
as controls for practices that aim in motivating manual employees
seems consistent with a wage-supervision trade-oﬀ, although the
wage-supervision relationship changes from positive and insigniﬁ-
cant to negative and insigniﬁcant.
In particular, we fail to ﬁnd any evidence of a negative bias due to
unobserved workers’ quality as it would be the case if the ’sorting by
ability’ model would be true, because again the inclusion of controls
58AH a u s m a ns p e c i ﬁcation test is used throughout in order to test whether the change in the
coeﬃcient of interest generated by the inclusion of extra and relevant to the theory controls is
signiﬁcant. In other words, the Hausman test is used to check whether unobserved variation
of factors that according to the ‘shirking’ model are expected to be correlated with wages and
supervision, may cause a bias in the estimated coeﬃcient of supervision intensity. Results of
the Hausman test suggest that although the inclusion of relative costs ratio dummies generate
as i g n i ﬁcant downward change in the coeﬃcient of monitoring intensity, the same is not the
case with subjective work intensity dummies.
59Note also, that although the ﬁndings indicate an increase in the coeﬃcient of monitoring
intensity, when we control for union bargaining power, a Hausman test suggests that the there
is no signiﬁcant and systematic negative ‘union’ bias, as predicted by the theoretical model
presented in one of the previous sections.
33for manual workforce characteristics causes a signiﬁcant decrease in
the magnitude of the coeﬃcient of interest.
Moreover, controlling for eﬀort intensity turns the coeﬃcient of
supervision intensity from positive to negative but the coeﬃcient re-
mains insigniﬁcant. This ﬁnding is consistent with one of the points
of the analysis of the previous sections, that if wages and supervi-
sion intensity are substitutes in eliciting eﬀort from employees, then
diﬀerences in the intensity of work across establishments is expected
to generate an upward bias which may mask a negative relationship
between wages and supervision.
Additionally, the inclusion of ‘eﬀort technology’ and ‘other moti-
vation devices’ controls seems to provide further support to the hy-
pothesis that if wages and supervision are eﬀort extracting devices,
then a positive endogeneity bias will be the result of unobserved
variation in factors that are correlated with the intensity and the
responsiveness of employees’ eﬀort.
Eﬀort technology controls include a dummy for employees’ bene-
ﬁts in the establishment as sick pay, free or subsidized meals and an
occupational pension over the standard employee pension, as well
as the proportion of employees dismissed or sanctioned over the last
year for disciplinary reasons. These variables are expected to pick up
how ‘conﬂictual’ or ‘cooperative’ are labour relations regimes across
establishments, which in turn according to Gordon (1990, 1994) may
indicate how responsive is employees’ eﬀort in motivation devices as
supervision and wages.
The wage-supervision trade-oﬀ increases in magnitude when ‘ef-
fort technology’ controls are included, as indicated in speciﬁcation
(5) but the trade-oﬀ is statistically insigniﬁcant. This ﬁnding may
support our prediction that if wages and supervision are eﬀort reg-
ulating devices, then excluding factors that determine the nature of
labour relations across establishments and thus the responsiveness
of employees’ eﬀort to personnel motivation practices, will cause an
upward bias in the coeﬃcient of supervision, as we would expect
that in establishments with more ‘conﬂictual’ labour relations ef-
fort will be more responsive in both wages and supervision and thus
these establishments will tend to pay higher wages and supervise
their employees more stringently.
As suggested in the analysis of the previous sections, the endo-
geneity bias of the wage-supervision relationship is expected to be
positive if wages and supervision are determined according to the ef-
ﬁciency wage rationale to elicit productive behaviour by employees,
because in establishments that managers implement human resource
practices that aﬀect employees’ productivity (which are unobserved
by the econometrician), wages and supervision are expected to be
lower compared to other establishments.
Estimates of the relationship of interest from speciﬁcation (6)
34that includes controls for whether there is merit pay for unskilled
manual workers and for whether appraisal systems are used for pay
rise and promotion for all employees in the establishment seem to
provide further support to the latter prediction.
In general, the results of estimation of wage equations from the
sample of establishments in the trading sector seem to indicate that
a wage-supervision trade-oﬀ m a ybem a s k e db yu p w a r do m i t t e dv a r i -
able bias.60
As the latter pattern is stronger in the private sector sample
than the full sample of establishments, we next look at estimation
results in the particular subsample of private and non-unionised es-
tablishments. The subsample of privately owned and non-unionized
establishments seems to be more interesting for the test of the wage-
supervision trade-oﬀ mainly because of three reasons.
The ﬁrst reason is because private and non-unionised establish-
ments are expected to have higher ability and incentive to take ad-
vantage of the wage-supervision trade-oﬀ, as unionised establish-
ments, may be limited in their ability to adjust wages and staﬃng
levels and government-owned establishments may not have the same
cost-minimisation incentives as privately owned establishments (Groshen
and Krueger 1990).
Moreover the fact that the essence of eﬃciency wages is the uni-
lateral and optimal setting of wages above the market clearing level
by employers in order to overcome asymmetric information prob-
lems, renders the private and non-unionised sector the ideal one to
test the validity of eﬃciency wages. Finally, the last reason for the
selection of the private and non-unionised sector is that there are no
considerations of a negative ‘union power’ bias in this sector private
and non-unionised sample of establishments, and thus one of the
explanations of the wage-supervision trade-oﬀ is dismissed.61
Thus, based on the later rationale, if the wage-supervision trade-
oﬀ holds and since it is expected to be more pronounced for private
and non-unionised establishments, it will be easier for one to trace
out the trade-oﬀ in this sector, after also trying to reduce any con-
60A Hausman test rejects the null that the coeﬃcient of supervisors to staﬀ in speciﬁcation
(2) is equal to the same coeﬃcient in speciﬁcation (6), which further suggests that there
is a signiﬁcant positive bias resulting by the exclusion of eﬀort related controls, as eﬀort
intensity and technology, and motivation practices. Furthermore, although we ﬁnd that when
ad u m m yf o rac l o s e ds h o pa n dad u m m yf o rw h e t h e ru n i o nn e g o t i a t e so v e rs t a ﬃng and
working conditions dummies as well as pay are included in the estimated speciﬁcation, the
coeﬃcient of the supervisor to staﬀ ratio increases, a Hasman test suggests that the change
is not signiﬁcant.
61The evidence produced by the full and trading sector samples does not support the predic-
tion that a signiﬁcant bias due to unobserved diﬀerences in union power across establishments
is the case. Neverthless, the pattern of change in the coeﬃcient of interest among speciﬁ-
cations with and without union power controls seems to be consistent with our theoretical
prediction of a negative union power bias that is based on the premise that unions negotiate
over eﬀort and that they ‘like’ wages and ‘dislike’ supervision.
35cerns of an upward bias in the coeﬃcient of interest by controlling
for the relevant factors.
The latter conjecture seems to be supported by the results pre-
sented in table 3, as the estimate of the relationship between wages
and supervision becomes from positive and insigniﬁcant, negative
and signiﬁcant, after controlling for all eﬀort related factors dis-
cussed above. A Hausman speciﬁcation test supports the hypothesis
that a signiﬁcant positive bias is the case once the eﬀort related con-
trols are excluded from the estimated speciﬁcation. Moreover, eﬀort
related controls as controls for eﬀort intensity, for eﬀort technology,
and other motivation devices are jointly but also individually signiﬁ-
cant. Finally, once more we fail to ﬁnd any evidence that supports a
negative unobserved ability bias, provided that workforce character-
istics controls are correlated with unobserved workforce quality. In
particular, we ﬁnd that in private and non-unionised establishments
that employ an extra supervisor per manual (and clerical) employee
wages are 0.06% lower.
In general, we ﬁnd evidence that seems to support an eﬃciency
wage rationale of the wage and supervision determination and which
further suggests that the endogeneity bias in the estimated relation-
ship between wages and supervision is expected to be positive and
thus it may mask the wage-supervision trade-oﬀ. Moreover, after
we restrict our analysis to the private and non-unionised establish-
ments, where we expect that any wage supervision trade-oﬀ will be
more pronounced, we manage to trace-out a negative relationship
between wages and supervision.
The discussion presented in the previous sections indicates that
there are more than one theoretical explanations of the wage-supervision
trade-oﬀ. In particular, sorting out alternative theoretical explana-
tions is another major problem that hinders many empirical studies
in the ﬁeld and a problem that is diﬃcult to solve, as suggested by
Groshen and Krueger (1990) and Kruse (1992).
A negative relationship between wages and supervision can be ex-
plained by: a) eﬃciency wages (the ‘shirking’ and the ‘gift-exchange’
versions of eﬃciency wage theory), b) the ‘sorting by ability’ model
(or unobserved employees’ quality, c) the theory of ‘equalising diﬀer-
ences’, where supervision is viewed by employees as a ‘good’ working
condition, d) (unobserved) occupational diﬀerences, e) and as we
show in one of the previous sectors by diﬀerences in union bargain-
ing power, when wages and supervision are determined by collective
bargaining, and unions ‘like’ wages and ‘dislike’ supervision.
The ‘sorting’ by ability model is generally considered as the most
diﬃcult to be distinguished by eﬃciency wages because as also sug-
gested by Groshen and Krueger (1990), this model is not only consis-
tent with a wage-supervision trade-oﬀ but also with the prediction
that in equilibrium, an increase in wage costs will be exactly oﬀset
36by a fall in supervision costs.62
Although we estimate wage equations across establishments for
a homogeneous in skills group of workers, there may still be unob-
served ability diﬀerences that may be correlated with supervision
intensity. This is the reason why we expect that the inclusion of
controls for workforce characteristics such as the proportion of fe-
male employees in the unskilled manual group and the proportion
of part-time employees in all manual employees may also pick up
some of the diﬀerences in employees’ quality.63
However, the evidence in this section suggests that, provided that
observed quality characteristics are correlated with unobserved, any
unobserved employee quality bias doesn’t seem to have the sign pre-
dicted by the ‘sorting by ability’ model. Moreover, we also ﬁnd that
the wage-supervision trade-oﬀ is generated after controlling for omit-
ted factors (eﬀort intensity, eﬀort technology, etc.) that are relevant
for the wage-supervision determination, based on an eﬃciency wage
shirking rationale. This latter ﬁnding seems to provide support to
the ‘shirking’ rather than the unobserved ability explanations of the
wage-supervision trade-oﬀ.
Finally, in the ‘sorting by ability’ model, the wage and supervi-
sion are used as devices to determine the quality of the workforce
and eﬀort is exogenous in this model. Thus, one should expect that
if the ‘sorting by ability’ model is true, a wage-supervision trade-oﬀ
should have been the case irrespective of the inclusion of eﬀort re-
lated controls in the estimated speciﬁcations, which is not the case
here.64
Hence, if the sorting by ability model was actually the case we
wouldn’t expect that any wage-supervision trade-oﬀ would be traced
out after we have controlled for eﬀort related factors, as the latter is
the exact prediction of the ‘shirking’ model and a relationship that
arises from the non-shirking condition or the equation of isoeﬀort
curves. Therefore, the latter discussion suggests that the ‘sorting’
by ability model does not seem to reconcile with the evidence of the
trade-oﬀ from this section.
62I nt h es h i r k i n gm o d e la ni n c r e a s ei nt h ew a g ew i l lc a u s ea ni n c r e a s ei nw a g ec o s t sb u t
because higher wages increase eﬀort, wage costs will be exactly oﬀset by a fall in supervision
costs. In the ‘sorting by ability’ model an increase in the wage will enable ﬁrms to hire better
quality employees who need less supervision and thus the higher wage costs will be oﬀset by
a fall in supervision costs.
63Industry dummies may also pick up some of employee quality diﬀerences.
64In one of the previous sections we suggested that based on the ‘sorting by ability’ model
isoability curves slope upwards in the wage-supervision intensity space and thus unobserved
diﬀerences in ability/quality of employees across establishments will generate shifts in the
isoability curves across establishments which will lead to a negative relationship between
wages and supervision to be traced-out. As shifts in the isoability curves are independent of
any changes in eﬀort we would expect that, if the sorting by ability model is true, the wage-
supervision trade-oﬀ would have been the case, irrespective of the inclusion of eﬀort controls,
which is not true here.
37Additionally, the same arguments could be used in order to dis-
miss the claim that the wage-supervision trade-oﬀ is attributed to
unobserved occupational diﬀerences,65 as if occupational diﬀerences
can explain the trade-oﬀ (Kruse 1992) then we should expect that
controls for eﬀort intensity, technology and other personnel moti-
vation processes would be irrelevant, and thus the trade-oﬀ would
be traced out, with or without those controls which is not the case
here.
I nt h ec a s et h a te ﬀort related controls are relevant because they
a r ec o r r e l a t e dw i t hu n o b s e r v e do c c u p a t i o n a ld i ﬀerences then as the
evidence suggests occupational diﬀerences will be consistent with
a positive and not a negative relationship between wages and su-
pervision. Finally, we could argue that occupational diﬀerences in
general may be also due to diﬀerences in the ‘eﬀort’ (in terms of in-
tensity, diligence, etc.) and the ‘quality’ requirements by employees,
in which case the eﬀort and employees quality controls are expected
to pick up some of the eﬀect of occupational factors.66 Thus, to the
extent that observed occupational factors are correlated with unob-
served, we could claim that occupational diﬀerences do not seem as
a very appealing explanation of the wage-supervision trade-oﬀ,i n
this case.
Furthermore, equalising diﬀerences could explain the negative
relationship between wages and supervision, if employees’ ‘like’ su-
pervision and thus they are willing to accept lower wages in the
case they are supervised more stringently. However, in this case the
evidence imply a positive association of wages and supervision that
operates via eﬀort intensity and eﬀort technology as well as through
the relationship of wages and supervision intensity with other hu-
man resources motivation practices. Therefore, the evidence seems
not to support a systematic negative association of wages and su-
pervision because of employees preferences over supervision, as we
ﬁnd that the direction of the bias suggests that in establishments
with higher supervision intensity (because of higher eﬀort intensity
requirements or more responsive eﬀo r to rb e c a u s eo ft h el i m i t e du s e
of other motivating practices) wages are also higher.67 Equalising
diﬀerences may be consistent with the ﬁnding of the positive eﬀort
bias in the estimate of the wage-supervision relationship, because
65Unobserved occupational diﬀerences may arise in our case as we don’t have any detailed
i n f o r m a t i o no no c c u p a t i o n a lc h a r a c t e r i s t i c s .
66Another reason for occupational diﬀerences is job hazard which we should expect that
will cause a positive bias in the wage-supervision relationship, as when employees should be
more cautious because of high probability of job accident, they should be paid a higher wage
and be monitored more stringently. Other controls in our speciﬁc a t i o n sa st h ed u m m yf o r
establishment in manufacturing or services may also pick up any occupational diﬀerences.
67Alternatively, the evidence of the upward eﬀort bias may be also consistent with the fact
that wages and supervision are both negatively associated with eﬀort and motivation, but
even in this case a positive association between wages and supervision holds.
38higher supervision intensity has as a result higher eﬀort and higher
wages provided that employees dislike putting eﬀort on the job. The
l a t t e ra r g u m e n ts u g g e s t st h a tt h eﬁndings may provide more sup-
port to an equalising diﬀerences explanation of a positive rather
than a negative wage-supervision relationship.
Therefore, as the wage-supervision trade-oﬀ is estimated for a
sample of non-unionised private-owned establishments, the ‘union-
power’ explanation of a negative relationship between wages and
supervision does not apply in this case, and thus based on the above
discussion, the evidence seem to be mostly consistent with the tenet
of eﬃciency wages, that wages and supervision are substitutes eﬀort
regulating inputs.68
Moreover, as discussed above this can be interpreted as indirect
evidence that wages aﬀect employees productive behaviour, which as
suggested in the previous sections is a necessary but not suﬃcient
condition for the validity of eﬃciency wages. In other words the
evidence seem to support one of the main assumptions of eﬃciency
wages that wages aﬀect employees productivity, but this doesn’t
necessarily imply that employers choose to pay higher wages in order
to elicit productivity, as there are other alternatives in motivating
employees except of eﬃciency wages.69
As suggested in one of the previous sections, this evidence is bet-
ter to be interpreted as providing support to principal-agent models,
many of which do not have the eﬃciency wage property. Thus, an-
other condition that needs to be satisﬁed in order that the eﬃciency
wages story is valid in the case of unskilled manual workers, is that
employers set wages optimally so that wage costs are oﬀset by a fall
in supervision costs.
W ew o u l de x p e c tt h a tt h ea b o v et e s tc a nb eb a s e do nt h ew a g e -
supervision trade-oﬀ estimate from the sample of private owned,
non-unionised establishments as in these establishments wages are
more likely to be determined unilaterally by employers. The es-
timate of wage costs produced by a 1% increase in the wage of
unskilled manual employees is $1.25 per employee as the average
wage of unskilled manual employees is $125.72.70 B a s e do ns a m p l e
estimates a 1% increase in the wage is expected on average to cause
68Even if the above arguments are not considered as suﬃcient to rule out all alternative
theoretical explanations of the wage-supervision trade-oﬀ in favour of eﬃciency wages, they
do support the hypothesis that there are valid eﬃciency wage eﬀects on wage-determination.
69In theory the standard alternatives to eﬃciency wages are incentive contracts as for ex-
ample piece-rate contracts, bonding or steeper tenure-earnings proﬁles, and tournaments.
Moreover, proﬁt or ownership sharing may be another alternative.
70As the wage observations are grouped, the average wage of unskilled manual workers is
estimated by an interval regression of unskilled wages on a constant. The estimate of the
constant is the estimate of the conditional expectation of the latent unobserved unskilled
manual wage variable, where conditioning is on the interval that includes the true value of
the dependent variable.
39a fall in supervision costs per employee equal to $38.12. Therefore
our calculations suggest that the wage is set so that the marginal
beneﬁt of the higher wage exceeds the marginal cost, which further
suggests that wages for unskilled manual workers have been set at a
lower level than the eﬃciency wage, as at the eﬃciency wage level a
marginal increase in the wage and thus in wage costs is equal to the
fall in supervision costs that is generated by the wage increase.71
However, this latter ﬁnding cannot be used to dismiss the hypoth-
esis that employers may pay eﬃciency wages, as our estimate of the
trade-oﬀ may be moderated by the endogeneity bias and measure-
ment error,72 and thus in the presence of these problems the wage-
supervision trade-oﬀ is made even more compelling.73 Therefore, all
in all the evidence in this section seem to support the main tenet of
eﬃciency wages that wages aﬀect employees productive behaviour
and cannot dismiss eﬃciency wages in favour of other alternative
motivation schemes.74
71This condition tests whether wages are set optimally at the eﬃciency wage level and
not whether wages are above market clearing. However, provided that the outside option
of unskilled manual employees is the average wage they can get in the non-unionised and
public sector ( which is the lowest wage an unskilled manual worker can get is he/she leaves
his/her job) then one could argue that wages in the trading, non-unionised sector are above
the market clearing wage. We ﬁnd that the average wage for unskilled manual workers in
the public, non-unionised sector is $45.25 which is much lower than the average wage in the
private, non-unionised sector.
72Another source of a positive bias in the coeﬃcient of the supervisor to staﬀ ratio is the
substitution of supervisors for workers generated by the increase in the relative wage of workers
(Groshen and Krueger 1990). In one of the previous sections we argued that if the ‘shirking’
rationale holds and if one also controls for diﬀerences in eﬀort intensity, we should expect that
the problem of substitution is moderated. However, even if substitution occurs in our case
and provided that the substitution bias is expected to be positive, this makes our estimate of
the trade-oﬀ even more compelling.
73As suggested above by the OLS equivalence of the MLEs of the parameters of interest
showed by Stewart (1983), measurement error is expected to attenuate the estimated coeﬃ-
cient of interest. Thus, based on the evidence of a positive endogeneity bias, we expect that
our estimates of the wage-supervision trade-oﬀ will be smaller in magnitude in the presense of
endogeneity and measurement error. Based on the sample estimates used in our calculations
above, we need an estimate of the trade-oﬀ of around 0.27 in order that the fall in supervision
costs exactly oﬀsets a 1% increase in wages for unskilled manual employees.
74As far as the validity and robustness of our results is concerned, the model we use for
estimation and inference, as well as interpretation may be inadequate i.e misspeciﬁed. In
this case the main speciﬁcation assumptions of the interval regression estimation technique
a r et h a t : a )t h em o d e li sl i n e a r ,b )t h ee r r o ri s homoscedastic and normally distributed,
and c) there are no omitted variables. Because Stewart (1983) showed that the MLEs of
the parameters of the above model are equivalent to the OLS estimators from a regression
of the conditional expectation of the latent unobserved variable on exogenous variables, we
expect that the violation of the above assumptions will have the same implications as in the
standard general linear framework. Thus, non-normality should not be a problem as long as
t h es a m p l es i z ei ss u ﬃciently large, but heteroscedasticity will lead to ineﬃcient estimates
and invalid inferences when the standard errors are estimated under the assumption that the
model is correct. Similarly, we would expect that omission of relevant variables will lead
to biased and inconsistent estimates. In our case we have already suggested that the main
causing variable of interest i.e supervision intensity is endogenous, and although we attempt
to tackle the endogeneity problem by controlling for confounding variables, the main aim of
406.2 Semi-Skilled
In this subsection we use the same methodology as in the pre-
vious section in order to identify the relationship between wages of
semi-skilled manual workers and the intensity of supervision across
establishments. Results are summarised in tables 4 to 6 (see table
section at the end). Table 4 presents estimation of semi-log wage
equations for semi-skilled manual employees using the full sample of
establishments observations in WIRS 1990.
The main results are similar to the analogous case for unskilled
manual employees. In particular, we fail to ﬁnd any statistically sig-
niﬁcant estimates of the relationship between wages and supervision,
as estimates turn from positive and insigniﬁcant to zero, once con-
trols for eﬀort intensity, eﬀort technology and for other motivation
devices are gradually introduced in the estimated speciﬁcation.
The pattern of change in the coeﬃcient of interest across spec-
iﬁcations that gradually include ‘eﬀort related’ controls seems to
support the prediction of a positive endogeneity bias, which accord-
ing to our theoretical analysis of the previous sections seems to be
consistent with a ‘shirking’ eﬃciency wages rationale. However, a
Hausman speciﬁcation test suggests that the change in the coeﬃ-
cient of the supervisor to staﬀ ratio generated by the inclusion of
eﬀort intensity and technology controls as well as controls for the
extent at which other practices are used to motivate employees, as
merit pay for semi-skilled manual employees and the use of appraisal
for pay rises and promotion, is not signiﬁcant.75
our empirical strategy is to identify the direction of the endogeneity bias and use the evidence
on the direction of the bias to assess the validity of the main theoretical explanations of
the relationship between wages and supervision. Although, endogeneity may be limited after
controlling for some confounding factors, it is expected to remain a problem and that is why we
expect that our model is misspeciﬁed. However, valid inferences can be produced, even under
misspeciﬁcation, as long as inferences are based on estimated asymptotic robust standard
errors. In particular, White (1982) showed that under misspeciﬁcation, the standard Wald
and LM tests based on the robust variance covariance matrix of the MLE, have the proper
size, are asymptotically equivalent and are asymptotically distributed as chi-squared with
degrees of freedom calculated in the traditional fashion. White also showed that the same
is not the case for the LR test. Moreover, White showed that the Quasi-MLE (QMLE, the
MLE under misspeciﬁcation), is a consistent estimator of the parameters that minimize the
Kullback-Leibler information criterion, and is asymptotically normal. This simply means
that the QMLE minimizes our ignorance about the true structure or loosely speaking that
consistently estimates the parameters that are the closest to the true parameters (Johnston
and Dinardo 1997). Therefore, the above synthesis of seminal results on interval regression and
ML estimation, suggests that our inferences are valid, as long as they are based on asymptotic
robust standard errors, and that any endogeneity and measurement error bias of our estimates
will be minimum. A simple test of the violation of the assumptions of model speciﬁcation
when the dependent variable is grouped is presented by Chesher and Irish (1987).
75In general eﬀort related controls are jointly signiﬁcant but only the dummies for merit pay
and appraisal systems for pay rises and promotion are individually signiﬁcant. The eﬀects of
other controls such as size, industry aﬃliation, ownership and union recognition dummies on
semi-skilled employees wages are signiﬁcant and their signs are consistent with other empirical
41Moreover, again we fail to ﬁnd any evidence that support either
the prediction of a negative unobserved employees’ quality bias, as
predicted by the ‘sorting by ability’ model or a negative bias because
of unobserved diﬀerences in union power across establishments.
Although we don’t ﬁnd any strong evidence of an upward omitted
variable bias for the full-sample of establishments, the ﬁndings may
be indicative of an upward bias in the coeﬃcient of interest and that
is why we next turn to investigate the wage-supervision relationship
for establishments in the private sector in particular, where as ar-
gued in the previous section the wage-supervision trade-oﬀ may be
more pronounced.
Table 5 summarises results from the subsample of all establish-
ments in the private (trading) sector. The ﬁndings again are in line
with the analogous case of unskilled manual employees, although
in this case the estimated coeﬃcient of interest turns from positive
and signiﬁcant to negative but insigniﬁcant. Although, the pattern
of change in the coeﬃcient of supervision intensity across the spec-
iﬁcations of table 6 seem to support the prediction of a positive
endogeneity bias, we fail to ﬁnd any evidence that the estimated
coeﬃcient of the supervisor to staﬀ ratio from speciﬁcation (6) (in
which all eﬀort related controls have been included) is systemati-
cally larger (in absolute value or more negative) from the analogous
coeﬃcient in speciﬁcation (2) (where no eﬀort related controls have
been included).76
Furthermore, table 6 summarises results for the subsample of
trading sector and non-unionised establishments. In this case, in
contrast to our analysis for unskilled manual workers, we fail to
ﬁnd a negative and signiﬁcant estimate of the relationship between
supervision intensity and wages, or even evidence of a signiﬁcant
positive upward bias due to unobserved diﬀerences in eﬀort inten-
sity, technology or for the implementation of personnel policies to
motivate semi-skilled manual employees. Moreover, in contrast to
the analogous case of the previous section, the evidence from this
section does not seem to support the conjecture that if the wage-
supervision trade-oﬀ holds, it is more pronounced in the private
and non-unionised sector. However, the pattern of the change in
the coeﬃcient of interest across speciﬁc a t i o n so ft a b l e6a sw e l la s
the signiﬁcance of eﬀort related controls is consistent with the pre-
diction of a positive endogeneity bias.
All in all the evidence for the case of semi-skilled manual em-
ployees suggest no systematic relationship between wages and su-
pervision (the estimated coeﬃcient tends to zero). However, the
results from the relevant literature.
76The Hausman test cannot reject the null that the coeﬃcients of the two speciﬁcations are
equal. Moreover, note that eﬀort intensity, eﬀort technology and motivation devices controls
are jointly and individually signiﬁcant.
42fact that the pattern of change in the coeﬃcient of the supervi-
sor to staﬀ variable seems to be consistent with the prediction of a
positive endogeneity bias combined with further concerns for endo-
geneity bias, measurement error and substitution of supervisors for
supervised employees that mask any wage-supervision trade-oﬀ that
may be in operation, may further suggest that one cannot rule out
eﬃciency wage theory in the case of semi-skilled manual employees,
even though we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant evidence of a wage-supervision
trade-oﬀ.F i n a l l y ,o n c em o r ew ef a i lt oﬁnd any evidence in favour
of negative bias generated either by unobserved diﬀerences in em-
ployees’ quality77 or by unobserved diﬀerences in union’s bargaining
power.
6.3 Skilled
In this section we present estimation results from semi-log wage
equations for skilled manual workers.78 T h er e s u l t sa r es u m m a r i s e d
in tables 7 to 9.
Table 7 presents results for the full sample of establishments in
WIRS 1990. Our ﬁndings for skilled manual employees for the full
sample of establishments are consistent with the ﬁndings for un-
skilled and semi-skilled in the analogous sample. In particular, the
coeﬃcient of interest tends closer to zero once eﬀort related controls
are gradually introduced in the estimated speciﬁcation, although
no evidence can be provided that there is signiﬁcant positive bias
generated from unobserved diﬀerences in eﬀort related controls.79
Moreover, on the one hand we fail to ﬁnd any support to the predic-
tion of a negative ‘employees’ ability’ bias, but on the other hand
the evidence suggests that there is a signiﬁcant negative bias in the
coeﬃcient of interest due to unobserved diﬀerences in union’s bar-
gaining power, a ﬁnding which supports our theoretical prediction
based on the assumptions that unions negotiate over pay and super-
vision and ‘like’ wages but ‘dislike’ supervision.80
77There are other studies with ﬁndings that cast doubt to the validity of the prediction of
the ‘sorting by ability’ model of a negative omitted variable bias in the relationship between
wages and supervision. For example Neal (1993) presents evidence that jobs in high-wage,
primary sector industries supervision is at least as intensive as in jobs in low-wage, secondary
sector industries. This ﬁnding may further suggest that provided that workers in high-wage,
primary sector jobs are of higher quality and are paid higher wages but are not less stringently
supervised than low-quality workers in secondary sector jobs.
78B a s e do nW I R S1 9 9 0d e ﬁnition, skilled manual workers are manual employees who have
received formal training through apprenticeship or its equivalent.
79A Hausman speciﬁcation test cannot reject the null that the coeﬃcient of the supervisor
to staﬀ from speciﬁcation (2) is equal to the same coeﬃcient from speciﬁcation (6). Note also
that eﬀort related controls are jointly signiﬁcant but only the dummies for all other costs to
labour costs share and the dummies for subjective work intensity are individually singiﬁcant.
80A Hausman test suggests that the coeﬃcient of interest is systematically larger in mag-
nitude in speciﬁcations that include dummies for closed shop and for union bargaining over
43Furthermore, as in previous sections if we restrict our analysis
to the sample of establishments in the trading sector we ﬁnd some
indication of a wage-supervision trade-oﬀ, although the estimate of
the trade-oﬀ is slightly insigniﬁcant, as presented in table 8. In
this case also the evidence seems to support the prediction of a
negative relationship between wages and supervision intensity that
may be masked by omitted variable bias, which may be further
consistent with an eﬃciency wage rationale of wage and supervision
determination. However, once more we fail to ﬁnd any evidence that
the observed positive bias is signiﬁcant.
Finally, results for the non-unionised subset of establishments in
the trading sector presented in table 9 indicate the same pattern
of change in the coeﬃcient of interest across speciﬁcations, as for
unskilled and semi-skilled but the estimate of the wage-supervision
relationship is negative but insigniﬁcant. Again, as in the case of
semi-skilled manual employees, no evidence can be provided of a
signiﬁcant positive bias in the coeﬃcient of the supervisor to staﬀ
ratio.81
In general, in this section we fail to ﬁnd any evidence of a signiﬁ-
cant relationship (positive or negative) between wages and supervi-
sion for skilled manual workers. Moreover, although the change in
the coeﬃcient of interest across diﬀerent speciﬁcations which grad-
ually include eﬀort related controls seems consistent with a positive
omitted variable bias, we fail to ﬁnd systematic evidence of a signif-
icant upward bias. This ﬁnding may be interpreted in terms of the
rationale that as higher wages generate also an income and not only
an incentive eﬀect on employees’ behaviour and as any income eﬀect
is expected to be higher for relatively skilled employees that are paid
relatively higher wages,82 i tm a yb et h ec a s et h a tt h ew a g eh a sn o
eﬀect on employees eﬀort as the income eﬀect oﬀsets the incentive
eﬀect of the wage.
Finally, we ﬁnd some support for the theoretical prediction pre-
sented in one of the previous section that a negative bias in the
coeﬃcient of interest may be the result of unobserved diﬀerences in
union bargaining power across establishments, but once again we
staﬃng and working conditions compared to speciﬁcations which do not include union power
controls. Another interesting ﬁnding is that even though estimated eﬀects of other controls as
size, industry aﬃliation etc, have the expected sign the union recognition dummy is insigniﬁ-
cant in all estimated speciﬁcations, which may suggest that there is no union wage diﬀerential
for skilled manual workers.
81A Hausman test cannot reject the null that the coeﬃcient of supervisor to staﬀ ratio in
speciﬁcation (2) is equal to the same coeﬃcient from speciﬁcation (6). The eﬀort intensity
and eﬀort technology controls as well as controls for personnel policies for motivating skilled
manual employees are jointly signiﬁcant but only the eﬀort intensity controls (all other costs
to labour costs share ratio and subjective eﬀort dummies) are individually signiﬁcant.
82Recall that in the case of labour supply, the evidence suggests that the income eﬀect is
more likely to more than oﬀset the substitution eﬀect, the higher is the wage/income of the
economic agent.
44fail to ﬁnd any evidence that supports a negative employees quality
bias in the estimate of the coeﬃcient of supervision intensity.
7 Conclusions
Eﬃciency wages explanation of involuntary unemployment and other
labour market phenomena cannot be ruled out on a priori theoreti-
cal grounds, and thus evidence is needed. More importantly, there
is no conclusive evidence as far as the validity of eﬃciency wages is
concerned (Manning and Thomas 1997, Autor 2003).
The main empirical question in the ﬁeld of eﬃciency wages, is
twofold: Is it true that higher wages increase employee’s produc-
tivity or quality? Given that the latter hypothesis holds, and thus
it pays to increase wages; Is it true that employers prefer to pay
eﬃciency wages in order to elicit productivity or enhance quality
of employees, instead of using alternative means (bonding or entry
fees)?
There is direct evidence on the ﬁrst empirical question as pro-
vided by empirical studies that try to estimate the eﬀects of wages on
productivity (Wadwhani and Wall 1991, Konings and Walsh 1994,
Levine 1992). There is also indirect evidence, from the wage struc-
ture across industries (Krueger and Summers 1988, Kruse 1992),
that supports the eﬃciency wages story. However, on the one hand
empirical studies that provide direct evidence suﬀer from endogene-
ity and identiﬁcation problems and on the other hand studies of
inter-industry wage diﬀerentials do not seem to support eﬃciency
wages because the relationship between industry wage diﬀerentials
and eﬃciency wages seems tenuous (Manning and Thomas 1997).
There is another empirical approach in the testing of eﬃciency
wages, which is particularly concerned with the predictions of the
‘shirking’ and the ‘gift-exchange’ models of eﬃciency wages and
seems to be relatively neglected in the literature (Manning and
Thomas 1997). In particular, both models predict that if the wage
is increased, for given eﬀort, monitoring intensity should be relaxed,
even though this is done via a diﬀerent mechanism in each model.
In the ‘shirking’ model this is the case because the higher wage
imposes a penalty to the shirker if caught and being dismissed,
whereas in the “gift-exchange model” this occurs because the higher
wage creates a climate of cooperation and reciprocity. This predic-
tion of these eﬃciency wages models provides a way to conduct an
indirect test of the eﬀects of wages on productivity which is a nec-
essary condition for the validity of eﬃciency wages.
Most of the empirical studies that try to estimate the wage-
supervision trade-oﬀ (Fitzroy and Kraft, 1986, Leonard, 1987, Neal,
1993, Brunnello, 1995) fail to ﬁnd any conclusive evidence probably
45because of endogeneity bias, as the intensity of supervision, is en-
dogenously and simultaneously determined with wages. Moreover,
measurement error in the supervision variable exacerbates estima-
tion problems generated by endogeneity.
Another major problem of empirical studies of the wage-supervision
trade-oﬀ is that they fail to distinguish between alternative theo-
ries or explanations of the wage-supervision trade-oﬀ (Groshen and
Krueger 1990) and therefore any evidence produced by these stud-
ies cannot be used to support or dismiss the validity of eﬃciency
wages. Finally, any empirical attempts that address the above prob-
lems (Groshen and Krueger, 1990, Krueger, 1991, Rebitzer, 1995)
provide evidence that supports only one of the two main empirical
questions for eﬃciency wages and their results cannot be generalised
as they focus on particular industries.
In this paper, we present an empirical test of the eﬃciency wage
theory, which is based on testing the prediction of the ‘shirking’ and
‘gift-exchange’ models, that in equilibrium, ceteris paribus, higher
wages are associated with lower intensity of supervision, using es-
tablishment level data from WIRS 1990.
Our identiﬁcation strategy is based on the estimation of the equa-
tion of isoeﬀort curves derived from the ﬁrm’s production function,
by exploiting variation in supervision intensity generated by vari-
ation in supervision costs (the wage of supervisors) across regions
and industries. In order to reduce the endogeneity bias arising from
omitted variables and the simultaneous determination of wages and
supervision intensity, we include controls for omitted variables that
a c c o r d i n gt oe ﬃciency wages are correlated with wages and super-
vision. In this way, we test for eﬃciency wages by testing whether
there is a bias generated by omission of variables that the eﬃciency
wage theory predicts that are correlated with wages and supervision
and whether the direction of the omitted variable bias is consistent
with eﬃciency wage theory predictions. The above strategy, under
certain conditions, also enables us to sort out alternative explana-
tions of a wage-supervision trade-oﬀ. Moreover, we also provide
a novel theoretical explanation of a negative relationship between
wages and supervision that suggests that a wage-supervision trade-
oﬀ may be the result of negative bias generated by unobserved dif-
ferences in trade union’s bargaining power across establishments,
when wages and supervision are determined by ﬁrm-union bargain-
ing and unions ‘like’ higher wages but ‘dislike’ stringent supervision.
Although our strategy enables us to reduce the bias, it does not elim-
inate it and thus the endogeneity problem that is widely faced by
the majority of studies in the topic is also a problem of this study.
Therefore, we our main contribution is to investigate the hypothesis
of the wage/supervision trade-oﬀ using UK establishment data, in
contrast to existing studies in the ﬁl e dt h a th a v eb e e nf o c u s e do n
46US data or data from other European countries.
I nt h ec a s eo fu n s k i l l e dm a n u a lw o r k e r sw eﬁnd evidence of a sig-
niﬁcant trade-oﬀ between wages and supervision which supports the
main tenet of eﬃciency wages that higher wages are positively corre-
lated with employees’ productivity. After also testing whether em-
ployers pay eﬃciency wages in order to elicit productive behaviour
by employees, by testing whether higher wages ‘pay for themselves’
we ﬁnd no evidence that can rule out eﬃciency wages in favour of
alternative motivation devices.
In the case of semi-skilled and skilled manual workers, the ev-
idence suggests that there is no systematic relationship between
wages and supervision or that the wage-supervision relationship is
negative but insigniﬁcant. However, the pattern of results in the
case of semi-skilled and skilled manual workers is fairly similar to
that of unskilled and is consistent with a positive omitted variable
bias predicted by the eﬃciency wages theory. Moreover, in the case
of skilled manual employees we ﬁnd some evidence of a small nega-
tive ‘union power’ bias.
In conclusion, we ﬁnd some evidence that suggests that there are
may exist valid eﬃciency wages considerations for unskilled manual
employees but not for semi-skilled and skilled manual employees.
This ﬁnding seems to provide some support to the main tenet of
the thesis that eﬃciency wages may be more relevant for low-wage
employees and that is why the eﬃciency wage theory may be par-
ticularly fruitful in explaining observed phenomena from low-wage
labour markets.
478T a b l e s
Table  1: Maximum Likelihood Estimation of Wage Equations for Unskilled 
Manual Employees (Full Sample) (Dependent variable is the log median wage for 
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establishment size  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Dummy for 















establishment  in 




















































Dummies for all 
other costs to 
labour costs ratio 
   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Work intensity  
dummies      Yes  Yes  Yes 
Effort Technology 
controls       Yes  Yes 
Controls for other 
personnel policies        Y e s  
























Sample  size  1120 1120 1120 1120 1120  1120 
 
Notes: Asymptotic robust standard errors in parentheses. Establishment size dummies include 8 
dummies for if number of employees is between 25 and 50, 50 and 100, 100 and 200, 200 and 500, 500 
and 1000, 1000 and 2000, 2000 and 5000, 5000 and 10000 respectively. Effort technology controls 
include a dummy for other benefits for unskilled manual, the proportion of non-redundant dismissed
48Table 2: Maximum Likelihood Estimation of Wage Equations for Unskilled 
Manual Employees (Trading Sector Sample) (Dependent variable is the log median 
wage for the majority gender in the unskilled manual group) 
 
Independent Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 















establishment size  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Dummy for 
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Dummies for all 
other costs to labour 
costs ratio 
   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Work intensity  
dummies      Yes  Yes  Yes 
Effort Technology 
controls        Yes  Yes 
Controls for other 

























Sample size  817  817  817  817  817  817 
 
Notes: Asymptotic robust standard errors in parentheses. Establishment size dummies include 8 
dummies for if number of employees is between 25 and 50, 50 and 100, 100 and 200, 200 and 500, 500 
and 1000, 1000 and 2000, 2000 and 5000, 5000 and 10000 respectively. Effort technology controls 
include a dummy for other benefits for unskilled manual, the proportion of non-redundant dismissed 
employees and the proportion of sanctioned employees due to disciplinary reasons in the previous year. 
Other personnel policies controls include dummies for merit pay for unskilled manual and for whether 
all employees are under appraisal for promotion and pay rises. The inclusion of ‘union power’ controls 
as dummies  for closed shop and for whether recognised unions negotiate over manning/staffing, etc. in 
(6) results in an estimated coefficient of the supervisor to staff ratio of -0.0149. A generalised Hausman 
test cannot reject the null that the coefficient of the supervisor to staff ratio in model (6) is the same 
with or without ‘union power’ controls, but it can reject the null when the test is about joint inclusion 
of controls for effort intensity, effort technology and other motivation devices.  
 
49Table 3: Maximum Likelihood Estimation of Wage Equations for Unskilled 
Manual Employees (Trading and Non-Unionised Sector Sample) (Dependent 




Variable  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5)  (6) 















establishment size  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes 
Dummy for 














Proportion female in 





















Dummies for all 
other costs to labour 
costs ratio 
   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Work intensity  
dummies      Yes  Yes  Yes 
Effort Technology 
controls        Yes  Yes 
Controls for other 

























Sample size  300  300  300  300  300  300 
 
Notes: Asymptotic robust standard errors in parentheses. Establishment size dummies include 8 
dummies for if number of employees is between 25 and 50, 50 and 100, 100 and 200, 200 and 500, 500 
and 1000, 1000 and 2000, 2000 and 5000, 5000 and 10000 respectively. Effort technology controls 
include a dummy for other benefits for unskilled manual, the proportion of non-redundant dismissed 
employees and the proportion of sanctioned employees due to disciplinary reasons in the previous year. 
Other personnel policies controls include dummies for merit pay for unskilled manual and for whether 
all employees are under appraisal for promotion and pay rises. A generalised Hausman test rejects the 
null that the coefficient of the supervisor to staff ratio in model (6) and in model (2) where no controls 
ff f t i t i tf f t t h l d t h t i t i d ij i t l i l d d l
50Table 4: Maximum Likelihood Estimation of Wage Equations for Semi-Skilled 
Manual Employees (Full Sample) (Dependent variable is the log median wage for 
the majority gender in the semi-skilled manual group) 
 
Independent  Variable  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 















establishment size  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Dummy for 
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Dummies for all 
other costs to labour 
costs ratio 
   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Work intensity  
dummies       Yes  Yes  Yes 
Effort Technology 
controls         Yes  Yes 
Controls for other 
personnel policies           Yes 
























Sample  size  908  908 908 908 908 908 
 
Notes: Asymptotic robust standard errors in parentheses. Establishment size dummies include 8 
dummies for if number of employees is between 25 and 50, 50 and 100, 100 and 200, 200 and 500, 500 
and 1000, 1000 and 2000, 2000 and 5000, 5000 and 10000 respectively. Effort technology controls 
include a dummy for other benefits for semi-skilled manual, the proportion of non-redundant dismissed 
employees and the proportion of sanctioned employees due to disciplinary reasons in the previous year. 
Other personnel policies controls include dummies for merit pay for semi-skilled manual and for 
whether all employees are under appraisal for promotion and pay rises. The inclusion of ‘union power’ 
controls as dummies  for closed shop and for whether recognised unions negotiate over 
manning/staffing, etc. in (6) results in an estimated coefficient of the supervisor to staff ratio of 0.013. 
A generalised Hausman test cannot reject the null that the coefficient of the supervisor to staff ratio in 
model (6) is the same with or without ‘union power’ controls as well as cannot also reject the null when 
the test is about joint inclusion of controls for effort intensity, effort technology and other motivation 
devices.  
 
51Table 5: Maximum Likelihood Estimation of Wage Equations for Semi-Skilled 
Manual Employees (Trading Sector Sample) (Dependent variable is the log median 
wage for the majority gender in the semi-skilled manual group) 
 
Independent Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 















establishment size  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes 
Dummy for 





























Proportion female in 





















Dummies for all 
other costs to labour 
costs ratio 
   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Work intensity  
dummies       Yes  Yes  Yes 
Effort Technology 
controls        Yes  Yes 
Controls for other 

























Sample size  764  764  764  764  764  764 
 
Notes: Asymptotic robust standard errors in parentheses. Establishment size dummies include 8 
dummies for if number of employees is between 25 and 50, 50 and 100, 100 and 200, 200 and 500, 500 
and 1000, 1000 and 2000, 2000 and 5000, 5000 and 10000 respectively. Effort technology controls 
include a dummy for other benefits for semi-skilled manual, the proportion of non-redundant dismissed 
employees and the proportion of sanctioned employees due to disciplinary reasons in the previous year. 
Other personnel policies controls include dummies for merit pay for semi-skilled manual and for 
whether all employees are under appraisal for promotion and pay rises. The inclusion of ‘union power’ 
controls as dummies  for closed shop and for whether recognised unions negotiate over 
manning/staffing, etc. in (6) results in an estimated coefficient of the supervisor to staff ratio of -0.053. 
A generalised Hausman test cannot reject the null that the coefficient of the supervisor to staff ratio in 
model (6) is the same with or without ‘union power’ controls as well as cannot also reject the null when 





52Table 6: Maximum Likelihood Estimation of Wage Equations for Semi-Skilled 
Manual Employees (Trading and Non-Unionised Sector Sample) (Dependent 




Variable  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 















establishment size  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Dummy for 














Proportion female in 





















Dummies for all 
other costs to labour 
costs ratio 
    Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Work intensity  
dummies      Yes  Yes  Yes 
Effort Technology 
controls        Yes  Yes 
Controls for other 

























Sample  size  252  252 252 252 252 252 
 
Notes: Asymptotic robust standard errors in parentheses. Establishment size dummies include 8 
dummies for if number of employees is between 25 and 50, 50 and 100, 100 and 200, 200 and 500, 500 
and 1000, 1000 and 2000, 2000 and 5000, 5000 and 10000 respectively. Effort technology controls 
include a dummy for other benefits for semi-skilled manual, the proportion of non-redundant dismissed 
employees and the proportion of sanctioned employees due to disciplinary reasons in the previous year. 
Other personnel policies controls include dummies for merit pay for semi-skilled manual and for 
whether all employees are under appraisal for promotion and pay rises. A generalised Hausman test 
cannot reject the null that the coefficient of the supervisor to staff ratio in model (6) and in model (2) 
where no controls for effort intensity, effort technology and other motivation devices are included, are 
equal.  
 
53Table 7: Maximum Likelihood Estimation of Wage Equations for Skilled 
Manual Employees (Full Sample) (Dependent variable is the log median wage for 
the majority gender in the skilled manual group) 
 
Independent Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 















establishment size  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes 
Dummy for 
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Proportion female in 





















Dummies for all 
other costs to labour 
costs ratio 
   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Work intensity  
dummies       Yes  Yes  Yes 
Effort Technology 
controls         Yes  Yes 
Controls for other 
personnel policies          Yes 
























Sample size  1087  1087  1087  1087  1087  1087 
 
Notes: Asymptotic robust standard errors in parentheses. Establishment size dummies include 8 
dummies for if number of employees is between 25 and 50, 50 and 100, 100 and 200, 200 and 500, 500 
and 1000, 1000 and 2000, 2000 and 5000, 5000 and 10000 respectively. Effort technology controls 
include a dummy for other benefits for skilled manual, the proportion of non-redundant dismissed 
employees and the proportion of sanctioned employees due to disciplinary reasons in the previous year. 
Other personnel policies controls include dummies for merit pay for skilled manual and for whether all 
employees are under appraisal for promotion and pay rises. The inclusion of ‘union power’ controls as 
dummies  for closed shop and for whether recognised unions negotiate over manning/staffing, etc. in 
(6) results in an estimated coefficient of the supervisor to staff ratio of 0.05. A generalised Hausman 
test rejects the null that the coefficient of the supervisor to staff ratio in model (6) is the same with or 
without ‘union power’ controls, but it cannot reject the null when the test is about joint inclusion of 
controls for effort intensity, effort technology and other motivation devices.  
 
54Table 8: Maximum Likelihood Estimation of Wage Equations for Skilled 
Manual Employees (Trading Sector Sample) (Dependent variable is the log median 
wage for the majority gender in the skilled manual group) 
 
Independent Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 















establishment size  Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Dummy for 
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Dummies for all 
other costs to labour 
costs ratio 
   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Work intensity  
dummies       Yes  Yes  Yes 
Effort Technology 
controls        Yes  Yes 


























Constant  887  887 887 887 887 887 
 
Notes: Asymptotic robust standard errors in parentheses. Establishment size dummies include 8 
dummies for if number of employees is between 25 and 50, 50 and 100, 100 and 200, 200 and 500, 500 
and 1000, 1000 and 2000, 2000 and 5000, 5000 and 10000 respectively. Effort technology controls 
include a dummy for other benefits for skilled manual, the proportion of non-redundant dismissed 
employees and the proportion of sanctioned employees due to disciplinary reasons in the previous year. 
Other personnel policies controls include dummies for merit pay for skilled manual and for whether all 
employees are under appraisal for promotion and pay rises. The inclusion of ‘union power’ controls as 
dummies  for closed shop and for whether recognised unions negotiate over manning/staffing, etc. in 
(6) results in an estimated coefficient of the supervisor to staff ratio of -0.1. A generalised Hausman 
test cannot reject the null that the coefficient of the supervisor to staff ratio in model (6) is the same 
with or without ‘union power’ controls, as well as it cannot also reject the null when the test is about 
inclusion of controls for effort intensity, effort technology and other motivation devices.  
 
 
55Table 9: Maximum Likelihood Estimation of Wage Equations for Skilled 
Manual Employees (Trading and Non-Unionised Sector Sample) (Dependent 
variable is the log median wage for the majority gender in the skilled manual group) 
 
Independent 
















establishment size  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Dummy for 




































Dummies for all 
other costs to 
labour costs ratio 
   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Work intensity  
dummies      Yes  Yes        Yes 
Effort Technology 
controls        Yes   
Yes 
Controls for other 

























Sample size  284  284  284  284  284  284 
 
Notes: Asymptotic robust standard errors in parentheses. Establishment size dummies include 8 
dummies for if number of employees is between 25 and 50, 50 and 100, 100 and 200, 200 and 500, 500 
and 1000, 1000 and 2000, 2000 and 5000, 5000 and 10000 respectively. Effort technology controls 
include a dummy for other benefits for skilled manual, the proportion of non-redundant dismissed 
employees and the proportion of sanctioned employees due to disciplinary reasons in the previous year. 
Other personnel policies controls include dummies for merit pay for skilled manual and for whether all 
employees are under appraisal for promotion and pay rises. A generalised Hausman test cannot reject 
the null that the coefficient of the supervisor to staff ratio in model (6) and in model (2) where no 
controls for effort intensity, effort technology and other motivation devices are included, are equal.  
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